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THE  REVOLVING  DOOR
Wentong Zheng*
ABSTRACT
The revolving door between the government and the private sector has long been presumed to
lead to the capture of regulators by industry interests.  A growing body of empirical literature,
however, either finds no conclusive evidence of a capture effect or finds evidence of an opposite
effect that the revolving door indeed results in more aggressive, not less aggressive, regulatory
actions.  To account for these incongruous results, scholars have formulated and tested a new
“human-capital” theory positing that revolving-door regulators have incentives to be more aggres-
sive toward the regulated industry as a way of signaling their qualifications to prospective indus-
try employers.
But even with the insights offered by the human-capital theory, the prevailing analyses of
the revolving door are still incomplete.  This Article theorizes on yet another incentive created by
the revolving door that deserves being recognized as a structural force inherent in the regulatory
process: the incentive for regulators to expand the market demand for services they would be
providing when they exit the government.  This “market-expansion” incentive may manifest itself
differently in different regulatory settings.  In the enforcement setting, it may result in more
enforcement actions, broadened jurisdictional reach of the enforcement actions, and higher penal-
ties in the enforcement actions.  In the rulemaking setting, it may result in agencies’ expanded
rulemaking authority, the use of flexible standards rather than bright-line rules, and agencies’
preference for complex as opposed to simple rules or standards.
This market-expansion theory represents a paradigmatic shift in conceptualizing the role of
individual regulators in the regulatory process.  Contrary to the prevailing analyses, which posit
that revolving-door regulators take the industry’s needs as given and merely respond to those
needs, the market-expansion theory suggests that revolving-door regulators may exert efforts to
expand the industry’s needs.  Recognizing this market-expansion incentive has important impli-
cations for a wide range of policy issues, including agency aggrandizement, overenforcement
versus underenforcement, regulatory settlements, compliance monitors, private rights of action,
and professional responsibility.
© 2015 Wentong Zheng.  Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce and
distribute copies of this Article in any format at or below cost, for educational purposes, so
long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to the Notre Dame Law Review,
and includes this provision in the copyright notice.
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of Law Schools New Scholar’s Colloquium for comments on early drafts of this Article.
1265
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\90-3\NDL307.txt unknown Seq: 2 23-FEB-15 12:01
1266 notre dame law review [vol. 90:3
INTRODUCTION
A familiar phenomenon in American government and law, the “revolv-
ing door”1 between the government and the private sector has been swinging
hard in recent years.  Since the beginning of President Obama’s second
term, several high-level government officials have walked through the prover-
bial door in both directions.  Mary Jo White, a litigator who spent the last
decade defending Wall Street banks and executives at the law firm Debevoise
& Plimpton LLP, was confirmed as the new chairwoman of the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC).2  The departing chairwoman of the SEC, Mary
Schapiro, became a consultant at the Promontory Financial Group, a high-
powered consulting firm that draws nearly one-third of its senior executives
from government agencies overseeing the financial industry.3  Jack Lew, the
new Treasury Secretary, once worked as a senior executive at Citigroup.4
Former U.S. Trade Representative Ron Kirk stepped down to join the law
firm Gibson Dunn & Crutcher.5  Former Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner
became president of the private equity firm Warburg Pincus several months
after stepping down from his government position.6  Going a bit further back
in time, other top administration officials leaving the government for the
private sector included Christine Varney, the antitrust chief at the Depart-
ment of Justice, who stepped down to join the law firm Cravath, Swaine &
Moore in 2011,7 and Peter Orszag, President Obama’s budget director, who
joined Citigroup as a vice chairman in 2010.8
1 See Developments in the Law: Conflicts of Interest in the Legal Profession, 94 HARV. L. REV.
1244, 1428–39 & n.60 (1981) (“The term ‘revolving door’ refers to the phenomenon of
individuals who move between government and the private sector and who are often regu-
lators one day, regulated the next, and regulators again the day after.”).
2 Sarah N. Lynch, Senate Confirms Mary Jo White as SEC Chairman, REUTERS (Apr. 8,
2013, 4:27 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/04/08/us-usa-congress-sec-
idUSBRE9370XR20130408.
3 Ben Protess & Jessica Silver-Greenberg, Former Regulators Find a Home with a Powerful
Firm, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 9, 2013, http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/04/09/for-former-reg-
ulators-a-home-on-wall-street/?hpw (reporting Mary Schapiro’s exit from the SEC to the
Promontory Financial Group).
4 Jeffrey Sparshott, Lew Wins Confirmation to Become Treasury Secretary, WALL ST. J., Feb.
27, 2013, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014241278873232937045783305426384081
64.html.
5 Catherine Ho, Obama’s Top Trade Negotiator Jumps to Gibson Dunn, WASH. POST, Apr.
1, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/capitalbusiness/obamas-top-trade-
negotiator-jumps-to-gibson-dunn/2013/04/01/3ca77360-97c2-11e2-b68f-dc5c4b47e519_
story.html.
6 Devin Banerjee & Ian Katz, Tim Geithner to Join Leveraged Buyout Firm Warburg Pincus,
BLOOMBERG (Nov. 17, 2013, 11:28 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-11-17/
tim-geithner-to-join-leveraged-buyout-firm-warburg-pincus.html.
7 Thomas Catan & Gina Chon, Antitrust Chief to Step Down, WALL ST. J., July 7, 2011,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303544604576430171298566868.html.
8 Eric Dash, Ex-White House Budget Director Joins Citigroup, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 2010,
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2010/12/09/ex-white-house-budget-director-joins-citi
group/.
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Not only has the revolving door frequently made news headlines, but it
has had a deep impact on the law.  Indeed, the revolving door has been such
a fixation in the law that special features or structures have been created to
mitigate its effects in many areas, such as administrative law, criminal proce-
dure, and professional responsibility.9
Among the concerns voiced about the revolving door, the most endur-
ing one is the risk of regulators being captured by industry interests.  Discus-
sions of regulatory capture and its impact on the regulatory process permeate
scholarly literatures in law, political science, and economics.10  The revolving
door has long been considered an important mechanism of regulatory cap-
ture: in order to secure a post-government position in the private sector, the
theory goes, regulators must bend the rules to curry favor with their prospec-
tive employers.11
9 See David Zaring, Against Being Against the Revolving Door, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 507,
509–10 (describing responses to the revolving door by administrative law, criminal proce-
dure, and professional responsibility rules).
10 See, e.g., Daniel P. Carpenter, Protection Without Capture: Product Approval by a Politi-
cally Responsive, Learning Regulator, 98 AM. POL. SCI. R. 613, 613 (2004) (arguing that
favorable policy arrangements for well-organized and wealthy interests do not necessarily
infer capture of the political process); David Freeman Engstrom, Agencies as Litigation Gate-
keepers, 123 YALE L.J. 616, 674–80 (2013) (discussing the impact of regulatory capture on
agencies’ abilities to serve as litigation gatekeepers); Stavros Gadinis, From Independence to
Politics in Financial Regulation, 101 CALIF. L. REV. 327, 348–50 (2013) (discussing how con-
cerns about regulatory capture have undermined the independent agency model); Jean-
Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, The Politics of Government Decision-Making: A Theory of Regula-
tory Capture, 106 Q.J. ECON. 1089, 1089 (1991) (developing an agency-theoretic approach
to interest-group politics and regulatory capture); Michael A. Livermore & Richard L.
Revesz, Regulatory Review, Capture, and Agency Inaction, 101 GEO. L.J. 1337, 1337 (2013) (dis-
cussing the role of regulatory capture in providing a normative foundation for regulatory
review of administrative actions); Saule T. Omarova, Bankers, Bureaucrats, and Guardians:
Toward Tripartism in Financial Services Regulation, 37 J. CORP. L. 621, 629–32 (2012) (arguing
that the 2008 financial crisis is attributable in large part to regulatory capture); Mark
Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justification for the Bureaucratic State, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1511,
1565–70 (1992) (discussing agency capture by private interest groups); Richard B. Stewart,
The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1667, 1684–87 (1975)
(describing how administrative agencies are captured by the interests they are charged to
regulate).
11 See, e.g., J. RONALD FOX, ARMING AMERICA: HOW THE U.S. BUYS WEAPONS 461 (1974)
(“[T]he availability of jobs in industry can have a subtle, but debilitating, effect on the
officer’s performance during his tour of duty . . . . If he takes too strong a hand . . . he
might be damaging his opportunity for a second career following retirement.”); KAY LEH-
MAN SCHLOZMAN & JOHN T. TIERNEY, ORGANIZED INTERESTS AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 342
(1986) (“[O]fficials take care of clients so that the clients will take care of them.”); Per J.
Agrell & Axel Gautier, Rethinking Regulatory Capture, in RECENT ADVANCES IN THE ANALYSIS
OF COMPETITION POLICY AND REGULATION 286, 292 (Joseph E. Harrington Jr. & Yannis Kat-
soulacos eds., 2012) (“The perspective of posterior employment in the regulated industry
may discipline the regulators and lead to pro-industry regulations.”); Rachel E. Barkow,
Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through Institutional Design, 89 TEX. L. REV. 15, 23
(2010) (citing the revolving door as a cause of regulatory capture); Zachary J. Gubler,
Public Choice Theory and the Private Securities Market, 91 N.C. L. REV. 745, 774 (2013) (“In
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Under the influence of the capture narrative, the risk of capture has
become the dominant concern about the revolving door.  The potentially
debilitating role of the revolving door was highlighted by Mary Schapiro dur-
ing her Senate confirmation hearing, in which she stated that a conflict
might be created by SEC regulators “walking out the door and going to a
firm and leaving everybody to wonder whether they showed some favor to
that firm during their time at the SEC.”12  The revolving door has also been
blamed for a series of high-profile regulatory failures ranging from the SEC’s
failures to prevent the Ponzi schemes of Bernard Madoff and R. Allen Stan-
ford to federal regulators’ failures to prevent the BP oil spill in the Gulf of
Mexico.13
A closer examination of the empirical evidence on the capture effect of
the revolving door, however, reveals that the capture narrative has been built
largely on presumptions.  A growing body of empirical literature either finds
no conclusive evidence that the revolving door leads to capture, or finds
exactly the opposite evidence.14  For instance, a recent study finds that SEC
lawyers are more, not less, aggressive in their enforcement efforts when they
subsequently leave the SEC to join law firms specializing in defending clients
charged by the SEC.15
To account for these incongruous empirical results, scholars have begun
to formulate and test alternative theories of the revolving door.  One such
theory, which has been corroborated by empirical studies in recent years,
focuses on incentives the revolving door creates for regulators to signal the
type of human capital valued by industry employers.16  According to this
“human-capital” theory, when industry-employers could not perfectly observe
regulators’ human-capital, revolving-door regulators would want to be more
aggressive, not less aggressive, in their enforcement actions as a way of signal-
ing their qualifications to industry employers.
order to secure [industry] jobs, it helps [for SEC regulators] to placate industry players
while still at the Agency . . . .”); George W. Hilton, The Basic Behavior of Regulatory Commis-
sions, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 47, 48 (1972) (arguing that a regulator has incentives not to
alienate members of the regulated industry because “employment in the regulated indus-
try is one of the most obvious opportunities after a regulator’s term in office”).
12 Nominations of: Mary Schapiro, Christina D. Romer, Austan D. Goolsbee, Cecilia E. Rouse,
and Daniel K. Tarullo: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs,
111th Cong. 28 (2009) (statement of Mary Schapiro, Chairman-Designate, Sec. & Exch.
Comm’n).
13 See Zaring, supra note 9, at 509.
14 For discussions of the empirical literature on the capture effects of the revolving
door, see infra Section I.B.
15 See Ed deHaan et al., Does the Revolving Door Affect the SEC’s Enforcement Outcomes?
25–26 (Rock Cent. for Corp. Governance at Stanford Univ., Working Paper No. 187; Stan-
ford Univ. Graduate Sch. of Bus., Research Paper No. 14-14), available at http://papers
.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2125560.
16 For discussions of the human-capital theory and its empirical evidence, see infra
Part II.
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But even with the insights offered by the more nuanced human-capital
theory, the prevailing analyses of the performance incentives created by the
revolving door are still incomplete.  This Article argues that the current
revolving-door literature is seriously lacking in not adequately recognizing
what could be referred to as the “market-expansion” incentive created by the
revolving door.  Under this market-expansion theory, revolving-door regula-
tors may have incentives to expand the market demand for services they
would be providing when they exit the government.  This market-expansion
incentive may manifest itself differently in different regulatory settings.  In
the enforcement setting, it may result in more enforcement actions, broad-
ened jurisdictional reach of the enforcement actions, and higher penalties in
the enforcement actions.  In the rulemaking setting, it may result in agencies’
expanded rulemaking authority, the use of flexible standards rather than
bright-line rules, and agencies’ preference for complex as opposed to simple
rules or standards.  In either case, revolving-door regulators’ focus may not
be on finding the best way to appeal to industry interests as the capture and
human-capital theories suggest, but on finding the best way to maximize,
through their own efforts, the market demand for their post-government
services.17
Recognizing revolving-door regulators’ market-expansion incentive has
far-reaching implications.  Most importantly, the market-expansion theory
represents a paradigmatic shift in conceptualizing the role of individual regu-
lators in the regulatory process.  Although prescribing starkly different per-
formance incentives, both the capture and human-capital theories posit that
regulators take the industry’s needs as given and merely respond to those
needs.  Under the market-expansion theory, however, regulators exert efforts
to expand the industry’s needs.  In this sense, the market-expansion theory
represents an entirely different way of approaching the power dynamics
between regulators and the regulated industries.
Given how extensively the revolving door has become intertwined with
the modern regulatory state, recognizing revolving-door regulators’ market-
expansion incentive has the potential to change the conventional ways of
thinking about a wide range of policy issues, including agency aggrandize-
ment, overenforcement versus underenforcement, regulatory settlements,
compliance monitors, private rights of action, and professional responsibility.
This Article explores the policy implications of the market-expansion theory
in those areas.18
This Article does not intend to argue that every regulator is subject to
the market-expansion incentive, any more than the capture theories intend
to argue that every regulator is subject to capture.  Nor does this Article
attempt to establish that the market-expansion incentive is the dominant
incentive facing regulators in every regulatory setting.  The goal of this Arti-
cle is to propose the market-expansion incentive as a possibility that has so
17 For expositions of the market-expansion incentive of the revolving door, see infra
Part III.
18 See infra Part III.
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far been underrecognized and under-theorized.  A future line of research
will be necessary to empirically test the market-expansion theory and to iden-
tify the specific regulatory settings where the market-expansion incentive is
more likely to be acted upon and turned into measurably different regulatory
outcomes.
I. CAPTURE
This Article begins with an examination of the main narrative that has so
far framed the public discourse on the revolving door: the “capture” narra-
tive.  As discussed below, various capture theories surmise that regulators
tend to formulate public policies in favor of the industries they regulate.  In
the revolving-door context, however, this capture narrative has not been fully
borne out by empirical evidence.
A. Capture and the Revolving Door: Theories
The traditional conceptualization of the regulatory process, aided by the
custom of referring to regulators as public servants or civil servants, is to
think of regulators as public-minded individuals who arrive at policy choices
based on their perceptions of the public interest.19  Judge Henry Friendly,
for instance, described an Interstate Commerce Commission that struggled
in deducing what the public interest required it to do in its exercise of rate-
making power amid ambiguous and shifting statutory guidance and abrupt
industry changes brought about by technological advances.20  Under this
conceptualization, if regulators happen to favor the regulated industries in
exercising their regulatory power, that would be because of their consciously
held policy beliefs or their vision of the public interest.21
Capture theories offer a revisionist approach to the regulatory process.
In sharp contrast to the public-interest theory, capture theories attribute reg-
ulatory favors for industries to the capture of regulators.22  These theories
19 Michael E. Levine & Jennifer Forrence, Regulatory Capture, Public Interest, and the
Public Agenda: Toward a Synthesis, 6. J.L. ECON. & ORG. 167, 168–69 (1990) (discussing the
tradition that describes governmental policymakers as public individuals); see also Abner J.
Mikva, Foreword to the Symposium on the Theory of Public Choice, 74 VA. L. REV. 167, 167 (1988)
(questioning the characterization of public officials as wealth-maximizing egoists).  For
general discussions of the concept of the “public interest,” see GLENDON SCHUBERT, THE
PUBLIC INTEREST: A CRITIQUE OF THE THEORY OF A POLITICAL CONCEPT 5–29 (1960), and
VIRGINIA HELD, THE PUBLIC INTEREST AND INDIVIDUAL INTERESTS 1–15 (1970).
20 Henry J. Friendly, The Federal Administrative Agencies: The Need for Better Definition of
Standards, 75 HARV. L. REV. 1263, 1263 (1962).
21 See, e.g., Steven P. Croley, Public Interested Regulation, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 7, 28–31
(2000) (arguing that ideology is an important motivator of regulators’ action); Steven Kel-
man, Occupational Safety and Health Administration, in THE POLITICS OF REGULATION 236, 250
(James Q. Wilson ed., 1980) (arguing that the pro-protection values of regulators at the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration provides the best explanation for the
agency’s action).
22 Levine & Forrence, supra note 19, at 169 & n.4.
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view the regulatory process as being dominated by special interest groups
that seek regulatory policies favoring their narrow interests.23  Embedded in
this view of the regulatory process is the view that regulators have narrow,
self-interested goals such as job retention, self-gratification from the exercise
of power, or post-government personal wealth.24  Regulators could accom-
plish those goals, according to the capture theories, by granting regulatory
favors to interest groups.25  This exchange relationship between the
demander and supplier of regulation forms the central critique of the regula-
tory process by George Stigler and other members of the public choice
school, which has become the most notable strand of the capture theories.26
Consistent with the predictions of the capture theories in general and
the public choice theory in particular, scholars have flagged the adverse
impact of the revolving door on regulators’ job performance.  Richard Pos-
ner suggested that regulators who use government service as a steppingstone
to private practice would have no incentives to vigorously advocate for the
public interest if doing so could not be translated into a larger post-govern-
ment private practice.27  George Stigler went a step further, arguing that reg-
ulators who seek to maximize their utility in related post-government
23 See MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THE-
ORY OF GROUPS (1965).  According to Olson, small groups are better situated than large,
diffused groups to overcome the collective action problems that impede group mobiliza-
tion. See id. at 28, 35.  Olson’s work was expanded and refined by a number of scholars in
different fields. See, e.g., GERALD MARWELL & PAMELA OLIVER, THE CRITICAL MASS IN A
MICRO-SOCIAL THEORY (1993); ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION
OF INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION (1990); George J. Stigler, Free Riders and Collective
Action: An Appendix to Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 359
(1974).
24 Levine & Forrence, supra note 19, at 169; see also George J. Stigler, The Theory of
Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3, 11 (1971) (arguing that the need for
reelection makes it impossible for legislators to vote according to the public interest).
25 See Croley, supra note 21, at 10 (“Politicians, as policymakers and policybreakers, are
well positioned to advance interest group goals.”).
26 The pioneering work of the public choice school was done by George Stigler. See
GEORGE J. STIGLER, Supplemental Note on Economic Theories of Regulation, in THE CITIZEN AND
THE STATE: ESSAYS ON REGULATION 137 (1975); Stigler, supra note 23; Stigler, supra note 24.
George Stigler’s theoretical framework was later formalized and refined by Sam Peltzman.
See Sam Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, 19 J.L. & ECON. 211 (1976).
Stigler’s approach can be traced to the earlier works of scholars including Anthony Downs,
James Buchannan, Gordon Tullock, and Mancur Olson. See JAMES M. BUCHANAN &
GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENSUS (1962); ANTHONY DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC
THEORY OF DEMOCRACY (1985); OLSON, supra note 23; GORDON TULLOCK, THE POLITICS OF
BUREAUCRACY (1965).  For overviews of the public choice school, see DANIEL A. FARBER &
PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION (1991); Steven P.
Croley, Theories of Regulation: Incorporating the Administrative Process, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1,
34–41 (1998); Ernesto Dal Bo´, Regulatory Capture: A Review, 22 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL.
203, 204–06 (2006).
27 Richard A. Posner, The Federal Trade Commission, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 47, 86 (1969).
But see Croley, supra note 21, at 29 (arguing that over time, regulators who remain with an
agency are those who believe in serving the public interest).
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industry work “must avoid open conflicts with the regulated industry.”28  This
account of the revolving door has found acceptance in mainstream scholar-
ships in law, political science, and economics concerning the regulatory
process.29
Contrary to the public choice theory, which treats regulatory decisions as
outcomes of regulators’ rational choices, alternative theories in recent years
attribute the capture of regulators to nonrational factors.  Jeffrey Rachlinski
and Cynthia Farina, for instance, constructed a model of governmental
errors based on flaws in human judgment.30  According to them, various
characteristics of the structures and processes of government exacerbate the
cognitive biases inherent in human decisionmaking and lead to improvident
policy despite regulators’ good motives.31  Similarly, scholars have identified
a set of behavioral biases that may partially explain the shortcomings or fail-
ures of the regulatory process at the SEC32 and at the Federal Reserve.33
Other nonrational factors that have been suggested to account for the cap-
ture of regulators include “social capture,” whereby regulators’ worldviews
are shaped by the composition of their social networks,34 and “cultural cap-
ture,” whereby regulatory decisions could be outcomes of “shared but not
explicitly stated understandings of the world.”35
B. Capture and the Revolving Door: Evidence
As detailed above, the capture theories point to a possible adverse effect
of the revolving door on regulators’ performance.  The exact mechanisms of
such effect may depend on whether the revolving door in question revolves
from government to industry or from industry to government.36  For regula-
28 STIGLER, supra note 26, at 165.
29 See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
30 See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Cynthia R. Farina, Cognitive Psychology and Optimal Govern-
ment Design, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 549, 553 (2002).
31 See id. at 554 (noting that cognitive psychology has shown that even people with
good motives can make bad choices).
32 See Stephen J. Choi & A.C. Pritchard, Behavioral Economics and the SEC, 56 STAN. L.
REV. 1, 20–42 (2003) (arguing that regulators at the SEC are vulnerable to a wide range of
behavioral biases).
33 See Carol A. Needham, Listening to Cassandra: The Difficulty of Recognizing Risks and
Taking Action, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2329, 2347–53 (2010) (arguing that cognitive biases
potentially contributed to the Federal Reserve’s failures to examine nonbank mortgage
originators during the housing bubble).
34 See Steven Davidoff Solomon, The Government’s Elite and Regulatory Capture, N.Y.
TIMES, June 11, 2010, http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2010/06/11/the-governments-elite-
and-regulatory-capture/ (suggesting that regulatory capture could result from the interac-
tion between regulators and the people they regulate).
35 See James Kwak, Cultural Capture and the Financial Crisis, in PREVENTING REGULATORY
CAPTURE: SPECIAL INTEREST INFLUENCE AND HOW TO LIMIT IT 79 (Daniel Carpenter & David
A. Moss eds., 2014) (arguing that cultural capture contributed to regulator failures in the
two decades leading up to the 2007–09 financial crisis).
36 Dal Bo´, supra note 26, at 214.
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tors who have moved from industry to government, they are said to be friend-
lier to industry because they have been “socialized” in the industry
environment.37  For regulators who are contemplating moving from govern-
ment to industry, they are said to have incentives to signal their appeal to
prospective industry employers by being lenient to them.38  These two mech-
anisms may work in conjunction with each other when regulators move back
and forth between government and industry, compounding any possible cap-
ture effects.
The possible capture effects of the revolving door pose a major public
policy concern because of the large number of regulators who enter or exit
the revolving door at key regulatory agencies.  One earlier study on the prev-
alence of the revolving door phenomenon was conducted by Ross Eckert,
who examined the career paths of 174 regulators who had been appointed
and confirmed to the International Criminal Court (ICC), the Civil Aeronau-
tics Board (CAB), and the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) by
December 31, 1977.39  Eckert found that of those 174 regulators, 37 held
related pre-government jobs in the private sector, and 72 took related post-
government jobs in the private sector.40  Eckert also found that many of
those regulators made a round trip through the revolving door.  Of the 37
regulators who held pre-government industry jobs, 50% of them returned to
such positions upon leaving the government.41  More recently, the Project on
Government Oversight, a nonprofit organization, issued a report detailing
the revolving door problems at the SEC.42  The report identified 219 former
SEC employees who filed nearly 800 post-government statements between
2006 and 2010 disclosing their representation of industry interests before the
SEC within two years of leaving the SEC.43  Those former SEC employees
were retained to represent prestigious firms in the consulting, finance, and
legal industries over a wide range of issues.44
37 Id.; see also Agrell & Gautier, supra note 11, at 291 (“Regulators with an industry
background may still look at issues with industry eyes and show sympathy for the view
expressed by the regulated.”); Stavros Gadinis, The SEC and the Financial Industry: Evidence
from Enforcement Against Broker-Dealers, 67 BUS. LAW. 679, 725–26 (2012) (“Theorists have
long argued that regulators with industry origins have become ‘socialized’ toward that
industry’s concerns and aspirations, carrying that perspective into their regulatory tasks.”).
Note that this channel of influence of the revolving door on regulators’ performance is
analogous to the concepts of “social capture” and “cultural capture” discussed above. See
supra notes 34–35 and accompanying text.
38 Dal Bo´, supra note 26, at 214.
39 Ross D. Eckert, The Life Cycle of Regulatory Commissioners, 24 J.L. & ECON. 113, 114
(1981).
40 Id. at 118.
41 Id. at 117–19.
42 See PROJECT ON GOV’T OVERSIGHT, REVOLVING REGULATORS: SEC FACES ETHICS CHAL-
LENGES WITH REVOLVING DOOR (2011), available at http://pogoarchives.org/m/fo/revolv
ing-regulators-20110513.pdf.
43 Id. at 7.
44 Id. at 12–17.
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However, despite the clear theoretical predictions of the capture effects
of the revolving door, the empirical literature on how the revolving door
might affect regulators’ performance is surprisingly thin and contains only
limited support for the proposition.  In 1979, William Gormley examined
whether prior employment with the broadcasting industry affected the voting
patterns of commissioners at the FCC.45  He found that commissioners with
industry backgrounds voted in favor of the industry more often than commis-
sioners without industry backgrounds.46  He also found, however, that the
political party affiliation of the commissioners was a better indicator of their
voting behavior than their prior industry employment.47  As a result, Gor-
mley could not isolate a capture effect that is attributable solely to the revolv-
ing door.  Furthermore, Gormley’s study only examines the impact of prior
industry employment on regulators’ performance, and sheds no light on how
prospective industry employment would affect regulators’ performance.
In 1981, Paul Quirk filled in the vacuum left by William Gormley by
studying whether regulators had incentives to favor the regulated industry in
order to enhance their future employment opportunities in the industry.48
Using data from interviews he conducted with fifty high-level officials from
four federal agencies, Quirk found that regulators did not feel that their level
of support for industry would affect their chances for prospective industry
employment.49  Instead, at one of the agencies studied, the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC), “the largest group of respondents perceived incentives
in exactly the opposite direction, that is, favoring anti-industry behavior.”50
Jeffrey Cohen in 1986 revisited the revolving door issue at the FCC,
examining the impact of both prior and prospective industry employment on
FCC regulators’ performance.51  As with Gormley, Cohen found evidence of
a noticeable effect of what he referred to as the “entrance version” of the
revolving door, that is, regulators moving from industry to government.
According to Cohen’s study, commissioners with prior industry employment
were more supportive of the industry than those without prior industry
employment.52  Cohen’s findings regarding the “exit” version of the revolv-
ing door, that is, regulators moving from government to industry, were
mixed.  He found that commissioners who took industry employment after
45 William T. Gormley, Jr., A Test of the Revolving Door Hypothesis at the FCC, 23 AM. J.
POL. SCI. 665, 666 (1979).
46 Id. at 674.  Specifically, Gormley found that two FCC commissioners who were for-
mer broadcasters were more likely than commissioners who were not former broadcasters
to vote in favor of the broadcasting industry in license renewals, program content enforce-
ment, and broadcast-cable conflicts. Id.
47 Id. at 675–76.
48 See PAUL QUIRK, INDUSTRY INFLUENCE IN FEDERAL REGULATORY AGENCIES (1981).
49 Id. at 164–65.
50 Id. at 148.
51 Jeffrey E. Cohen, The Dynamics of the “Revolving Door” on the FCC, 30 AM. J. POL. SCI.
689–90 (1986).
52 Id. at 693–94.
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leaving office were on average less, not more, supportive of the industry.53
He did find, however, that in their last year on the FCC, commissioners sub-
sequently hired by the industry showed more support of the industry com-
pared to previous years, and they also showed more support of the industry
than commissioners not subsequently hired by the industry.54  As with Gor-
mley, however, Cohen found that the effects of the revolving door on regula-
tors’ performance became much more muted when controls for other
commissioner characteristics and presidential and congressional influences
were added to his model.55
Yet another study that found inconclusive evidence of the capture effects
of the revolving door is a 1992 study by Toni Makkai and John Braithwaite on
the impact of the revolving door on self-described regulatory attitudes of Aus-
tralian nursing home inspectors.56  Their study showed no clear behavioral
patterns as predicted by the capture theories: nursing home inspectors’ prior
industry experience had no or little effects on their identification with the
industry, sympathies with the industry’s problems, and toughness in compli-
ance enforcement.  Inspectors who expressed willingness to work in the
industry upon leaving the government showed more identification and sym-
pathies with the industry, but no less toughness in compliance enforce-
ment.57  Because of these mixed results, the authors concluded that the
capture effects of the revolving door lack merit as an analytical concept and
are determined by situational, not structural, factors.58
More recently, Martin Grace and Richard Phillips studied whether state
insurance regulators who were subsequently hired by the insurance industry
favored the industry in regulating insurance prices.59  They found that regu-
lators who accepted jobs in the insurance industry upon leaving office
allowed higher insurance prices while in office, compared to regulators who
accepted jobs in other industries upon leaving office.60  The net effect of the
government-to-industry revolving door on insurance prices, however, was
fairly small and only marginally statistically significant.61
In sum, although capture theorists have surmised that the revolving
door is an important mechanism of capture, the empirical veracity of that
mechanism has not been conclusively established.  The effects of the revolv-
ing door on regulators’ performance, if any, appear to vary from agency to
agency, and do not lend support to a coherent behavioral pattern.
53 Id. at 694–95.
54 Id. at 695.
55 Id. at 697–704.
56 Toni Makkai & John Braithwaite, In and Out of the Revolving Door: Making Sense of
Regulatory Capture, 12 J. PUB. POL’Y 61, 62–63 (1992).
57 Id. at 67–68.
58 Id. at 61.
59 Martin F. Grace & Richard D. Phillips, Regulator Performance, Regulatory Environment
and Outcomes: An Examination of Insurance Regulator Career Incentives on State Insurance Mar-
kets, 32 J. BANKING & FIN. 116, 117 (2008).
60 Id. at 130.
61 Id.
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II. HUMAN CAPITAL
As discussed above, empirical studies on the impact of the revolving
door on regulators’ performance have not shown a consistent capture effect.
In particular, for the government-to-industry revolving door, two studies have
even indicated an opposite effect: regulators who are subsequently hired by
the industry are shown to be more aggressive, not less aggressive, toward the
industry.62  To account for this anomalous result, scholars have formulated
and tested an alternative theory of the revolving door—the “human-capital”
theory.
A. The Human-Capital Theory
The authors of the earlier studies on the effects of the revolving door on
regulators’ performance offered some intuitive ideas about why the revolving
door might incentivize regulators to be more aggressive toward the industry.
Explaining his finding that FTC lawyers perceived that an anti-industry stance
would enhance their career prospects in the private sector, Paul Quirk
observed that demonstrating aggressiveness and effectiveness in enforcement
will make regulators “attractive potential employee[s] of the private sec-
tor.”63  Similarly, Jeffrey Cohen, who found that FCC commissioners who
accepted jobs in the broadcasting industry after leaving office were on aver-
age less supportive of the industry, reasoned that “[i]t may make more sense
to hire someone with the knowledge or skills that will help the industry, even
if the person once opposed the industry, than to hire a friend who can add
little to the business.”64
In 1995, economist Yeon-Koo Che refined and formalized Quirk’s and
Cohen’s conjecture and offered a more nuanced theory of the incentives
created by the revolving door than are suggested by the capture theories.65
According to Che, the traditional capture models of the revolving door focus
on the ex post effects of the revolving door on regulators’ performance, but
ignores the ex ante incentives the revolving door creates for regulators to
acquire regulatory human capital.66  Che posits that regulators may choose
to invest in two forms of human capital, technical expertise or influence con-
tacts, depending on which one is sought by industry employers.67  If industry
employers hire regulators for their technical expertise, the presence of the
revolving door will incentivize regulators to acquire regulatory human capital
that will improve their monitoring of the industry.68  If industry employers
hire regulators for their influence contacts, the presence of the revolving
62 See QUIRK, supra note 48, at 163–64; Cohen, supra note 51, at 694–95.
63 QUIRK, supra note 48, at 172.
64 Cohen, supra note 51, at 695.
65 See Yeon-Koo Che, Revolving Doors and the Optimal Tolerance for Agency Collusion, 26
RAND J. ECON. 378, 379–80 (1995) (laying out the incentive approach).
66 Id.
67 Id. at 385.
68 For a formal proof of this proposition, see id. at 383–85.
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door will divert regulators’ attention away from the acquisition of regulatory
human capital that is complementary to their regulatory performance.69
When the regulatory human capital valued by industry employers is tech-
nical expertise, not influence contacts, Che further demonstrates that the
presence of the revolving door might create a positive performance incentive
for regulators.  Che assumes that industry employers cannot directly observe
regulators’ qualifications but can indirectly obtain that knowledge through
observing regulators’ monitoring efforts.70  Given that, regulators will try to
signal their industry qualifications to prospective industry employers by
choosing an appropriate level of monitoring efforts.71  Che proves that
under the reasonable assumption that high-quality regulators face a lower
marginal cost of monitoring than low-quality regulators, different types of
type regulators will choose different levels of monitoring efforts, resulting in
a separating equilibrium.72  In other words, when industry employers look
for regulatory expertise in their agency hires, regulators will have incentives
to be more aggressive towards the industry as a way of demonstrating that
they possess the qualities sought by the employers.
The human-capital theory of the revolving door, therefore, predicts a
performance incentive opposite of that suggested by the capture theories.
When all of the conditions required for a human-capital effect are satisfied—
that is, when industry employers seek regulatory expertise, when they cannot
directly observe that expertise, and when it costs less for high-quality regula-
tors to exert the same level of regulatory efforts than low-quality regulators—
the presence of the revolving door may lead to more aggressive, not less
aggressive, regulatory actions.
The strict conditions required under the human-capital theory, however,
impose significant limitations on the applicability of the theory.  The human-
capital theory might be able to predict regulators’ behavior in the enforce-
ment setting, where regulators’ technical expertise can be demonstrated
through aggressive enforcement actions.  But the theory offers little guidance
in settings where industry employers do not value regulators’ technical exper-
tise or in settings where industry employers do value regulators’ technical
expertise but such expertise cannot be observed through aggressive regula-
tory actions.
B. Human Capital and the Revolving Door: Evidence
To varying degrees, empirical studies in recent years have corroborated
the human-capital theory of the revolving door in the enforcement setting.
Edward Glaeser, Daniel Kessler, and Anne Piehl in 2000 examined the
69 See id.
70 Id. at 385–86.  Che shows that when industry employers have full information about
regulators’ qualifications, they can trivially separate different types of regulators by offering
different wages and each category of regulators will choose a monitoring level commensu-
rate with their innate abilities. Id. at 387.
71 Id. at 387.
72 For a formal proof of this conclusion, see id. at 386–88.
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impact of the career concerns of federal prosecutors on the federalization of
drug crimes.73  They modeled the allocation of drug cases between the state
and federal jurisdictions in a system in which federal prosecutors have rela-
tively greater resources than their state counterparts.74  Using survey data on
state and federal inmates incarcerated for drug crimes, they found that fed-
eral prosecutors appear to prosecute criminals who are older, more success-
ful in the legitimate sector, more likely to be married, more likely to be Army
veterans, less likely to have a criminal record, and more likely to hire private
defense attorneys.75  The authors offered two possible explanations for their
results: first, federal prosecutors might be maximizing social welfare by allo-
cating more resources to cases that are important or are difficult to prose-
cute; and second, they might be seeking to try high-profile individuals “either
to obtain political benefits, or to develop their legal skills and connections in
the private sector by arguing against skilled private attorneys.”76  The latter
explanation is apparently consistent with the human-capital theory of the
revolving door, although the authors did not refer to it by name.  The
authors were unable, however, to establish with certainty that the career con-
cerns of federal prosecutors were the primary driving force of the federaliza-
tion of drug crimes.77
Richard Boylan in 2005 studied the effects of the job performances of
high-level federal prosecutors who were employed at the rank of U.S. Attor-
ney on their subsequent career outcomes.78  Using a sample of 570 U.S.
Attorneys who were in office from 1969 to 2000, Boylan demonstrated that
longer prison sentences increase the likelihood that a U.S. Attorney becomes
a federal judge, and increase the likelihood that the U.S. Attorney becomes
either a federal judge or a partner in a large private practice.79  Although
Boylan did not frame his study as one on the revolving door, his results are
indeed consistent with the human-capital theory of the revolving door, which
73 Edward L. Glaeser, Daniel P. Kessler & Anne Morrison Piehl, What Do Prosecutors
Maximize? An Analysis of the Federalization of Drug Crimes, 2 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 259, 261
(2000).
74 Id. at 286.
75 Id. at 288.
76 Id. at 261.
77 The authors found evidence supporting both explanations.  On one hand, the
authors found that consistent with the social-welfare view, federal prisoners were associated
with longer prison sentences.  On the other hand, the authors found that federal prisoners
received longer prison sentences even when they were incarcerated only for drug posses-
sion.  According to the authors, this is consistent with the career-returns view, as “it is hard
to believe that high-human-capital people who are sentenced for possession are the most
serious criminals.” Id. at 288.
78 Richard T. Boylan, What Do Prosecutors Maximize? Evidence from the Careers of U.S. Attor-
neys, 7 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 379, 379 (2005).
79 Id. at 396.  However, other performance measures, including conviction rates and
the number of indictments, were not found to affect the post-government careers of U.S.
Attorneys. Id. at 379.
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predicts that, everything else being equal, regulators who are more aggressive
toward the industry have better post-government careers.
In a 2012 study, economists Ed deHaan, Simi Kedia, Kevin Koh, and
Shivaram Rajgopal queried the consequences of the revolving door at the
SEC.80  They examined data on the career paths of 336 SEC lawyers involved
in 284 SEC enforcement actions against fraudulent financing reporting over
the period 1990 to 2007 and found that the intensity of the SEC lawyers’
enforcement efforts is higher when the lawyers leave to join law firms that
specialize in defending clients charged by the SEC.81  The authors explicitly
attributed their findings to Yeon-Koo Che’s human-capital theory82 and
argued that their results show that the revolving door will promote more
aggressive regulatory activities.83
David Zaring in 2013 analyzed the performance incentives of the revolv-
ing door for a group of federal prosecutors.84  Zaring followed the subse-
quent job histories of 152 prosecutors who were employed at the Criminal
Division of the U.S. Attorney’s Office in the Southern District of New York in
2001.85  Zaring uncovered mixed effects of the revolving door: the number
of annual criminal cases brought by the prosecutors reduces the probability
of them entering the private sector, while the number of pleadings men-
tioned in Westlaw increases the probability of them entering the private sec-
tor.86  Other performance-related measures, such as the length of prison
terms given out by the prosecutors and the number of mentions in New York
Law Journal, do not appear to affect the prosecutors’ decisions to move to
the private sector.87  Instead, Zaring found that the best predictor of the
choice to go through the revolving door is ethnicity.88  Zaring argued that, at
a minimum, his findings offer no support for the capture theories of the
revolving door.89  According to Zaring, what could have distracted regulators
from pursuing their self-interest are the incentives of “reputation, effective-
ness, and mission fulfillment.”90  Without explicitly referring to Che’s
80 deHaan et al., supra note 15, at 2.
81 Id. at 25–26.  The lawyers’ enforcement efforts are proxied by the monetary value of
the damages collected by the SEC, the likelihood of winning the case, the likelihood of
criminal proceedings, and the likelihood of naming the CEO as a defendant. Id. at 2–3.
82 See id. at 2 (citing Che’s study).
83 Id. at 37 (“[F]uture job prospects, on average, appear to make SEC lawyers increase
their enforcement efforts in trying civil cases.”).
84 Zaring, supra note 9, at 530–46.
85 Id.  Zaring was able to identify these prosecutors because their names and tempo-
rary phone numbers were published in the New York Law Journal after the terrorist attacks
on September 11, 2001 rendered their offices in downtown Manhattan uninhabitable. Id.
at 531 n.128.
86 Id. at 545.
87 Id. at 544–45.
88 Id. at 545.  Zaring reports that without controlling for ethnicity, gender appears to
have an effect on the decision to go into private practice.  But the effect of gender disap-
pears after a control variable for ethnicity is added to the regression. Id.
89 Id. at 546.  Note that Zaring uses the term “sell-out” instead of “capture.” See id.
90 Id. at 549.
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human-capital theory, Zaring considered his findings to be supportive of the
theory, reasoning that “[t]he right way to signal worth to private prospective
employers may be, among enforcement officials, at least, aggressive pursuit of
wrongdoing while in the public sector.”91
These studies corroborating the human-capital theory, however, do not
necessarily discredit the capture theories as some of the studies claimed.92
After all, the human-capital theory concerns only the government-to-industry
revolving door, while the capture theories encompass the revolving door in
both directions, both government-to-industry and industry-to-government.93
Even with respect to the government-to-industry revolving door alone, the
human-capital theory and the capture theories could both be valid as they
require different conditions.  It is no coincidence that all studies supporting
the human-capital theory are in the enforcement setting and involve techni-
cal skills.94  The validity of the human-capital theory in that setting does not
necessarily invalidate the capture theories in other settings, settings that may
be more prone to capture.
That said, the human-capital theory does explain regulators’ behavior in
ways that are overlooked by the capture theories.  Together with the capture
theories, the human-capital theory paints a more complete picture of the
diverse incentives facing regulators in different regulatory settings.
III. AN ALTERNATIVE THEORY: MARKET EXPANSION
While the human-capital theory complements the capture theories in
explaining the performance incentives the revolving door creates for regula-
tors, it is not the only one that holds such promise.  In this Part, this Article
contends that both the capture theories and the human-capital theory fail to
account for what could be referred to as the “market-expansion” incentive of
the revolving door, that is, the incentive for regulators to expand the market
demand for services they would be providing when they exit the government.
Despite being evident in various regulatory settings, this market-expansion
incentive has only received isolated, if any, attention from scholars and
policymakers alike.
91 Id. at 520.
92 DeHaan, Kedia, Koh, and Rajgopal argued that their results “provide preliminary
input to the discussion among the press, policy makers, and Congress about whether
revolving doors are detrimental to the SEC’s regulatory efforts.”  deHaan et al., supra note
15, at 37.  Zaring asserted that the capture theories give a “parsimonious, even crabbed”
reading of the motivations of law enforcement officials and deserve “some complication.”
Zaring, supra note 9, at 549.
93 See supra Section I.A.
94 Recall that these are necessary conditions for the human-capital incentive of the
revolving door. See supra Section II.A.
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A. Market Expansion: A General Theory
A market-expansion theory of the revolving door points to a different
performance incentive of the revolving door.  It posits that in the enforce-
ment setting, regulators who have their sights on the revolving door may have
incentives to bring more enforcement actions, levy higher penalties, and
work to expand the scope of matters subject to the agency’s authority.  In the
rulemaking setting, the theory goes, regulators who contemplate moving to
the private sector may focus their efforts not on whether the rules they are
making are friendly or unfriendly to their prospective industry employers,
but on whether the rules are broad enough and complex enough to require
expertise in interpretation.  In both settings, the underlying motives of the
regulators are not based on capture or human capital, but based on their
desires to increase the market demand for services they would be providing
in the private sector after they exit the revolving door.
Some crude concepts of the market-expansion theory already exist in
the current literature.  In analyzing the impact of the revolving door on regu-
latory outcomes, Richard Posner suggests that regulators contemplating pri-
vate practice upon leaving office would have no incentives to be aggressive
towards the industry if doing so could not result in a larger private practice.95
Larry Ribstein argues that in the criminal prosecution context, the existence
of the revolving door increases prosecutors’ incentives to bring more prose-
cutions, as “increasing the number of successful prosecutions can make the
revolving door more lucrative.”96  Ribstein aptly analogizes this phenomenon
to prosecutors “turn[ing] up the fire so they can sell extinguishers.”97  Mike
Koehler voices concerns about Department of Justice (DOJ) officials charged
with enforcing the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) exiting the DOJ to
join law firms defending clients facing FCPA investigations.98  These con-
cerns notwithstanding, revolving-door regulators’ potential market-expan-
sion incentive has yet to be recognized as a structural force inherent in the
regulatory process.
While the literature has not systematically examined the market-expan-
sion incentive in the revolving-door context, it has long recognized regula-
tors’ financial interests in public law enforcement and regulation in general.
William Niskanen argues that regardless of whether regulators are motivated
by selfish considerations, they all care about “salary, perquisites of the office,
public reputation, power, patronage, output of the bureau, ease of making
95 See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
96 Larry E. Ribstein, Agents Prosecuting Agents, 7 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 617, 631 (2011).
Ribstein could be referring to the human-capital incentive, however, as prosecutors could
benefit from more aggressive prosecutions through building up their human capital. See
supra Section II.A.
97 Ribstein, supra note 96, at 631.
98 See Mike Koehler, DOJ FCPA Unit Chief Joins FCPA Inc., FCPA PROFESSOR (Jan. 28,
2014), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/doj-fcpa-unit-chief-joins-fcpa-inc?utm_source=feed
burner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+thefcpaprofessor+%28FCPA+Pro
fessor%29.
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changes, and ease of managing the bureau,” and all of those can be accom-
plished by having a bigger agency budget.99  Nicholas Parrillo demonstrates
that historically, in the eighteenth century and often far into the nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries, the incomes of public officials in the United
States consisted of fees or bounties for services they performed: judges
charged fees for cases they heard, prosecutors won a bounty for each crimi-
nal they convicted, and tax investigators received a percentage of the tax eva-
sions they discovered, to name just a few examples.100  It was only later, when
this bargaining-based system became incompatible with both liberal-demo-
cratic principles and the practical need to maintain public trust in govern-
ment, that those fees and bounties were replaced with salaries.101  Margaret
Lemos and Max Minzner contend that even today, regulatory agencies
staffed with salaried officials have ample incentives to prioritize and maxi-
mize financial recoveries.102  According to Lemos and Minzner, these incen-
tives stem from institutional arrangements that allow agencies to retain a
portion of the financial awards they win, as well as agencies’ reputational
interests in using the amounts of financial recoveries to signal the impor-
tance of their work to lawmakers and the public.103  Lemos and Minzner
further argue that these institutional incentives are internalized by individual
regulators, who care about the agencies’ institutional goals because of “hard
incentives, such as bonuses and termination, or soft pressures, like self-moti-
vation and peer pressure.”104  In an analysis resembling the human-capital
theory of the revolving door, Lemos and Minzner acknowledge that “non-
career” regulators, that is regulators who intend to leave for the private sector
after a short period of time, have incentives to build their litigation skills as a
way of appealing to their prospective employers.105  But they argue that these
skill-oriented incentives do not necessarily conflict with agencies’ institu-
tional goal of maximizing financial recoveries.106
99 WILLIAM A. NISKANEN, JR., BUREAUCRACY AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 38–42
(1971). But see Daryl J. Levinson, Empire-Building Government in Constitutional Law, 118
HARV. L. REV. 915, 932 (2005) (“Even if most bureaucrats were primarily interested in
lining their own pockets, the relationship between a larger agency budget and higher sala-
ries or cushier working conditions is empirically tenuous.”).
100 NICHOLAS R. PARRILLO, AGAINST THE PROFIT MOTIVE: THE SALARY REVOLUTION IN
AMERICAN GOVERNMENT, 1780–1940, at 1 (2013).
101 Id. at 359.
102 See Margaret H. Lemos & Max Minzner, For-Profit Public Enforcement, 127 HARV. L.
REV. 853, 856 (2014) (arguing that public enforcers often seek large monetary awards for
self-interested reasons divorced from the public interest in deterrence).
103 Id. at 856–57.
104 Id. at 888.
105 Id. at 892.  Indeed, Lemos and Minzner cite to the foundational work of the human-
capital theory by Yeon-Koo Che to support their argument that industry employers are
inclined to hire the regulators who are most valuable to them, not the regulators who gave
them the most favors. See id. at 892 n.163.
106 Id. at 892.
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The market-expansion theory of the revolving door extends this line of
analysis to the revolving-door context.  If financial incentives are inherent in
the regulatory process and are part of the incentives facing individual regula-
tors, they are likely to be taken into account by regulators who attempt to
maximize their expected payoffs in the private sector.107  The market-expan-
sion theory surmises that regulators may act on such financial incentives in a
different way than is commonly understood under the capture and human-
capital theories—that is, not by appealing to prospective industry employers,
but by engaging in market-expansion efforts.
The market-expansion incentive differs substantially from the human-
capital incentive.  Aside from being applicable to not only the enforcement
setting but also the rulemaking setting, the market-expansion theory is predi-
cated on a different action mechanism than the human-capital theory.  The
human-capital incentive presumes a fixed level of demand for regulators’
post-government services; regulators have to compete against one another
through more aggressive enforcement to demonstrate their qualifications for
a post-government position in the private sector.  The market-expansion
incentive, by contrast, increases the aggregate demand for regulators’ exper-
tise and therefore expands the amount of opportunities available to all regu-
lators.  The human-capital incentive exists essentially because of the inability
of industry employers to differentiate among regulators, and aggressive
enforcement is the action taken by highly skilled regulators to overcome this
informational hurdle.  But under the market-expansion theory, even if
employers could perfectly observe regulators’ qualifications, regulators would
still have incentives to engage in aggressive enforcement, because doing so
would increase the aggregate demand for their post-government services.  In
other words, the human-capital incentive incentivizes regulators to vie for the
same piece of a pie, while the market-expansion incentive incentivizes regula-
tors to make the pie larger.108
More fundamentally, compared to the capture and human-capital theo-
ries, the market-expansion theory represents a paradigmatic shift in the
thinking surrounding the performance incentives of the revolving door.  The
human-capital theory, although predicting a performance incentive opposite
of those suggested by the capture theories, shares a fundamental commonal-
ity with the capture theories in terms of the power dynamics they portray
between regulators and industry employers.  Both the capture and human-
capital theories view industry employers as the dominant party that sets the
terms of the relationship between regulators and industry employers.  Under
the capture theories, regulators must win the goodwill of industry employers
107 Indeed, the capture and human-capital incentives discussed above are two other
ways for regulators to act on these financial incentives.
108 As an example of the intertwined relationship between the market-expansion incen-
tive and the human-capital incentive, David Zaring did not distinguish the market-expan-
sion incentive from the human-capital incentive when he considered the hiring of Mark
Mendelsohn by the law firm Paul Weiss as an example of regulators benefiting from the
revolving door by “working hard.” See Zaring, supra note 9, at 520.
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by being lenient towards them, whereas under the human-capital theory, reg-
ulators must win the attention and recognition of industry employers by
being aggressive towards them.  Under both sets of theories, regulators take
the industry’s needs as given and merely respond to those needs.  Under the
market-expansion theory, however, regulators exert efforts to expand the
industry’s needs.  The market-expansion theory, therefore, paints the power
dynamics between regulators and industry employers the opposite way.
This Article does not argue that the market-expansion incentive explains
regulators’ behavior in every regulatory setting.  Rather, this Article attempts
to prove the point that the market-expansion incentive merits recognition at
least from a theoretical point of view, as there are reasons to believe that it is
as plausible as, or even more plausible than, the capture and human-capital
incentives.  The capture incentives rely on an implicit contract: by being
friendly towards a prospective industry employer, a regulator hopes that the
employer will return the favor someday by hiring him or her when he or she
is ready to exit the government.109  But this implicit contract is time-inconsis-
tent.  By the time the regulator is ready to leave the government, all of the
favors have been done and the employer would have no compelling reasons,
other than goodwill, to return the favor.110  Of course, the regulator’s exper-
tise might be of value to the employer, but that would have been the case had
the regulator not been friendly towards the employer.  By contrast, if a regu-
lator has structurally expanded the reach of a regulatory regime through
aggressive enforcement or broad, complex rules, by the time the regulator is
ready to leave the government, it would be in the best interest of a prospec-
tive industry employer to hire the regulator for its legal defense and compli-
ance needs.  That would be the case even if the personal relationships
between the regulator and the employer had not been all that pleasant.
From a regulator’s point of view, expanding the reach of the regulatory
regime on account of which he or she would be providing services to future
clients is certainly more reliable than an implicit quid pro quo contract in
securing a post-government position in the private sector.
Similarly, there are reasons to believe that the market-expansion incen-
tive is at least as plausible as the human-capital incentive.  If, as the human-
capital theory asserts, regulators have incentives to be aggressive in carrying
out their regulatory duties for purposes of signaling their human capital, they
would also have incentives to be aggressive in carrying out their regulatory
duties for purposes of expanding the market demand for their post-govern-
ment services.  To be sure, regulators face a classic collective action problem
when engaging in market-expansion efforts, as the benefits of market expan-
sion inure to all regulators while the costs of market expansion are
shouldered by individual regulators alone.111  This collective action problem,
109 This contract is likely to be implicit in most cases because it would be a violation of
the law and the regulator’s ethical duties if it were written out explicitly.
110 Lemos & Minzner, supra note 102, at 891–92.
111 This collective action problem is inherent in any group action.  For formulations of
the collective action problem, see OLSON, supra note 23, at 5–52.
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however, is alleviated by the small size of the regulators’ groups112 and social
norms that might exist in the regulatory community.113
Below, this Article discusses the market-expansion incentive in the
enforcement setting and in the rulemaking setting respectively.  For each set-
ting, it details the different manifestations of the market-expansion incentive
and examines what conditions are conducive to the market-expansion
incentive.
B. Market Expansion in Enforcement
1. Manifestations of the Market-Expansion Incentive
In the enforcement setting, the market-expansion incentive may mani-
fest itself in three simple ways.  First, it may motivate regulators to bring a
larger number of enforcement actions.  The more enforcement actions regu-
lators bring, the more market demand there will be for their services when
they exit the government to defend against such enforcement actions.114
Second, the market-expansion incentive may prompt regulators to expand
the jurisdiction of their agencies.  The broader the scope of activities subject
to regulators’ enforcement authority, the more market demand there will be
for their post-government services.115  Finally, the market-expansion incen-
tive may lead to regulators imposing higher monetary or nonmonetary penal-
ties in enforcement actions.  Everything else being equal, higher penalties
increase the stakes of the enforcement actions and lead to higher spending
on legal defense, thereby increasing the market demand for regulators who
would be providing such legal defense.
2. Conditions Conducive to the Market-Expansion Incentive
From a theoretical point of view, the market-expansion incentive is
arguably an incentive facing every regulator who contemplates exiting the
revolving door.  Yet in any given case, the market-expansion incentive is likely
one of the many factors impacting regulators’ performance—the capture
112 Mancur Olson argues that small-sized groups are more effective and coherent in
coordinating group actions. See id. at 53–57.
113 Elinor Ostrom argues that desires to conform to social norms help overcome the
collective action problem. See, e.g., Elinor Ostrom, Collective Action and the Evolution of Social
Norms, 14 J. ECON. PERSP. 137, 144 (2000) (“[S]ocial norms may lead individuals to behave
differently in the same objective situation depending on how strongly they value conform-
ance with (or deviance from) a norm.”).
114 The revolving-door-minded regulators’ incentive to bring more enforcement
actions differs from the incentives of regulators pursuing other goals. See Sanford C.
Gordon & Gregory A. Huber, Citizen Oversight and the Electoral Incentives of Criminal Prosecu-
tors, 46 AM. J. POL. SCI. 334, 335–36 (2002) (proposing a model in which elected prosecu-
tors maximize conviction rates).
115 In an analogous setting, Larry Ribstein argues that prosecutors have incentives to
create and expand theories of criminal liability so as to increase the private sector’s
demand for former prosecutors who can defend firms from these charges and counsel
them on how to avoid criminal liability. See Ribstein, supra note 96, at 631.
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and human-capital incentives being others, and competing financial incen-
tives and regulators’ senses of duty and professional ethics being other nonfi-
nancial factors.  So whether the market-expansion incentive will dominate
other incentives and factors to produce measurable effects is an empirical
question whose answer may vary on a case-by-case basis.
But one can identify certain conditions that are conducive to the market-
expansion incentive, that is, conditions under which the market-expansion
incentive is expected to be particularly strong.  Such conditions include a
relatively large degree of regulatory discretion, enforcement targets with
ample financial resources, the possession of specialized skills and knowledge
by regulators, and the lack of a private right of action.
First, regulators need regulatory discretion before they can adjust the
level and manner of their enforcement efforts to benefit their post-govern-
ment careers.116  This condition is likely present in most enforcement set-
tings.  As for prosecutors, given that the vast majority of criminal cases are
not tried before a judge,117 there are essentially no effective checks on the
manner in which prosecutors exercise their prosecutorial authority.118  Dis-
cretion is also a defining feature of enforcement by regulators in administra-
tive agencies.119  Consequently, as a general matter, regulators who
contemplate a post-government career in the private sector likely have the
requisite discretion for the market-expansion incentive.120
116 It is worth noting that regulatory discretion is a key condition conducive not only to
the market-expansion incentive, but also to the capture and human-capital incentives.  If
regulators’ actions were rigidly constrained by law or public policy, they would not be able
to alter their enforcement actions to serve their personal objectives, be they currying favor
with prospective industry employers or building or signaling human capital.
117 See Ronald Wright & Marc Miller, Honesty and Opacity in Charge Bargains, 55 STAN. L.
REV. 1409, 1415 (2003) (stating that the rate of guilty pleas increased from 85.4% in 1991
to 96.6% in 2001).
118 See Rachel E. Barkow, Institutional Design and the Policing of Prosecutors: Lessons from
Administrative Law, 61 STAN. L. REV. 869, 876–84 (2009) (discussing the broad power that
federal prosecutors enjoy); Rachel E. Barkow, Separation of Powers and the Criminal Law, 58
STAN. L. REV. 989, 1024–28 (2006) (discussing the lack of oversight on prosecutorial discre-
tion); Ma´ximo Langer, Rethinking Plea Bargaining: The Practice and Reform of Prosecutorial
Adjudication in American Criminal Procedure, 33 AM. J. CRIM. L. 223, 248 (2006) (arguing that
prosecutors are the sole de facto adjudicator in criminal cases).
119 See David J. Barron & Todd D. Rakoff, In Defense of Big Waiver, 113 COLUM. L. REV.
265, 272 (2013) (“All agencies have significant enforcement discretion concerning the stat-
utes that they administer.”); Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Federalism as a Safeguard of the Separation
of Powers, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 459, 466 (2012) (“Even when Congress delineates their sub-
stantive mandates more particularly, agencies retain significant enforcement discretion,
effectively allowing them to shape the content of federal law.”); Robert J. Delahunty &
John C. Yoo, Dream On: The Obama Administration’s Nonenforcement of Immigration Laws, the
DREAM Act, and the Take Care Clause, 91 TEX. L. REV. 781, 790–91 (2013) (discussing a
memorandum issued by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement director John Mor-
ton instructing subordinates on the exercise of prosecutorial discretion).
120 A caveat is that regulators’ discretion might be limited in enforcement actions that
are dictated by political imperatives.
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Second, regulators’ market-expansion incentive is expected to be
stronger when the enforcement targets have the financial resources to pay
for legal defense and compliance.  Or put differently, the market-expansion
incentive will lead regulators to focus their enforcement efforts on targets
that have the financial resources to pay.  This “deep pocket” effect has been
well documented in private litigation121 and public enforcement.122  When
regulators are responsive to financial incentives, as revolving-door regulators
arguably are, the depth of the financial resources of the enforcement targets
becomes an important factor in determining where to focus their enforce-
ment efforts.
Third, regulators’ market-expansion incentive would be stronger when
they possess specialized skills.  For regulators with skills that are valuable in a
wide range of enforcement areas (e.g., general prosecutorial skills), the mar-
ket demand for their skills would be plenty when they exit the government
and their prospect in the private sector would not hinge as much on their
own market-expansion efforts.  When regulators possess specialized skills that
are valuable only in a narrow set of enforcement settings, however, they
would face stronger incentives to engage in market-expansion efforts to
increase the exit opportunities available to them once they leave the
government.
Finally, all else being equal, regulators’ market-expansion incentive
would be stronger when there are no private rights of action to create
demand for regulators’ post-government services.  When only the govern-
ment can enforce a statute, government enforcement becomes the only
source of market demand for legal defense and compliance efforts.  In such
scenarios, regulators would find their exit opportunities limited if they do
not bring enough enforcement actions.  By contrast, regulators who enforce
statutes that authorize private rights of action would find their expertise
appealable not only to clients defending government enforcement actions,
but also to clients defending private actions.  A caveat, however, is that the
importance of private actions for regulators’ market-expansion incentive is
tempered by the follow-on nature of such actions.  In many areas where pub-
lic enforcements and private actions coexist, a large percentage of private
actions are filed as follow-on cases to government enforcement actions.123
121 See, e.g., Frances Floriano Goins, Defending Clients from Securities Fraud Claims, in
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN SECURITIES LAW *9 (2013 ed.), available at 2013 WL 5290488 (“In
the wake of the recent financial meltdown and continuing economic difficulties, deep-
pocket defendants, and particularly financial institutions, are named as defendants in
nearly every securities fraud and Ponzi scheme case.”).
122 See, e.g., Lemos & Minzner, supra note 102, at 884 (“[Federal agencies] frequently
target their enforcement actions against large defendants with deep pockets.”).
123 The best example of the follow-on nature of private actions can be found in anti-
trust law, where the broad channel of actions begins as public enforcement actions
brought by the FTC or the DOJ, to be followed by private actions seeking monetary restitu-
tion or compensation. See Samuel Issacharoff, Class Actions and State Authority, 44 LOY. U.
CHI. L.J. 369, 380 (2012).  An earlier study found that between 1973 and 1983, nearly a
quarter of all private antitrust actions were filed as follow-on cases. See Thomas E. Kauper
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So even with private rights of action, regulators would still face the market-
expansion incentive, as private actions themselves depend, at least partially,
on government actions.
3. A Case Study: The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
The market-expansion incentive in the enforcement setting can be illus-
trated using the enforcement of the FCPA as an example.  Enacted in 1977 in
response to U.S. corporations’ overseas bribery scandals revealed during the
Watergate era,124 the FCPA prohibits U.S. companies, certain foreign issuers
of securities, and any persons in U.S. territory from corruptly making pay-
ments to foreign officials for purposes of obtaining or retaining business.125
The FCPA also requires certain issuers of securities to make and keep accu-
rate books and records and to maintain an internal accounting control sys-
tem to ensure compliance with the FCPA.126  Two government agencies, DOJ
and the SEC, are charged with enforcing the FCPA.127  The FCPA does not
provide for a private right of action,128 although plaintiffs have been filing
private actions against FCPA violations on other statutory grounds.129
The FCPA has had an uneven pace of enforcement since its enactment.
During the statute’s first twenty-five years, FCPA enforcement actions totaled
only a handful of cases per year, resulting in only modest penalties.130  The
& Edward A. Snyder, Private Antitrust Cases that Follow on Government Cases, in PRIVATE ANTI-
TRUST LITIGATION 329, 358 (Lawrence J. White ed., 1988).  Plaintiffs also routinely file fol-
low-on derivative lawsuits, security fraud actions, tort and contract claims, employment
lawsuits, and private actions under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
Act. See Aryeh S. Portnoy & John L. Murino, Private Actions Under the U.S. Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act: An Imminent Front?, INT’L LITIG. NEWS (Int’l Bar Ass’n Legal Practice Div.,
London, U.K.), Apr. 2009, at 32.
124 See Carolyn Lindsey, More Than You Bargained For: Successor Liability Under the U.S.
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 35 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 959, 961 (2009) (“While investigating
contributions to Richard Nixon’s re-election campaign, Congress discovered that over 400
U.S. companies had paid bribes in excess of $300 million through offshore slush funds in
order to win contracts overseas.” (footnote omitted)); see also Mike Koehler, The Story of the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 929, 934–35 (2012) (detailing allegations or
admissions of questionable payments by U.S. corporations to foreign government officials
or foreign political parties in years leading up to the enactment of the FCPA).
125 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 to -3 (2012).
126 Id. § 78m.
127 See Mike Koehler, The Fac¸ade of FCPA Enforcement, 41 GEO. J. INT’L L. 907, 923–24
(2010) (discussing the division of responsibilities between DOJ and SEC in FCPA
enforcement).
128 See Lamb v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 915 F.2d 1024, 1027–30 (6th Cir. 1990) (holding
that the FCPA does not create an implied private right of action).
129 See Portnoy & Murino, supra note 123, at 32 (discussing private actions against FCPA
violations filed as securities fraud suits, shareholder derivative suits and suits under the
Racketeering Influenced Corrupt Organizations Act).
130 Joseph W. Yockey, Choosing Governance in the FCPA Reform Debate, 38 J. CORP. L. 325,
330 (2013); see also Amy Deen Westbrook, Enthusiastic Enforcement, Informal Legislation: The
Unruly Expansion of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 45 GA. L. REV. 489, 522 (2011).
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FCPA was so rarely enforced in the early years that a bar journal stated that
no sooner had the FCPA been signed into law than it “effectively became a
dead letter.”131  Since the early 2000s, however, FCPA enforcement has
picked up speed and intensity.  During FCPA’s first twenty-eight years, DOJ
and the SEC typically initiated just two or three cases a year.132  Since then,
FCPA enforcement has spiked: the number of unique FCPA enforcement
actions initiated by DOJ and the SEC was thirteen in 2007, ten in 2008,
eleven in 2009, twenty in 2010, and sixteen in 2011.133  In recent years, DOJ
officials have stated on different occasions that FCPA enforcement actions
are at an all-time high and will likely remain high.134
Not only are FCPA enforcement actions increasing in number, but they
are also expanding in scope.  The FCPA requires a “business purpose” test; it
applies only to payments intended to induce or influence a foreign official to
use his or her position to assist in “obtaining or retaining business.”135  The
typical kinds of bribes that would satisfy this business purpose test are bribes
paid in order to obtain or retain government contracts.136  But in 2004, in
United States v. Kay, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed
the DOJ’s theory that the FCPA could potentially apply to bribes paid to for-
eign officials for purposes of lowering a defendant’s taxes and customs
duties.137  After examining the FCPA’s legislative history, the Fifth Circuit
held that Congress intended for the FCPA to apply “broadly to payments
intended to assist the payor, either directly or indirectly, in obtaining or
retaining business.”138  Since Kay, FCPA enforcement actions have been
brought against firms that made payments intended to generate general busi-
ness advantages such as those involving foreign licenses, permits, and certifi-
131 John Gibeaut, Rupert Murdoch, Embattled in the U.K., Grapples with U.S. Bribery Law, 98
A.B.A. J. 52, 55 (2012).
132 Ethan S. Burger & Mary S. Holland, Why the Private Sector Is Likely to Lead the Next
Stage in the Global Fight Against Corruption, 30 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 45, 52 (2006).
133 See FCPA Digest: Recent Trends and Patterns in the Enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Prac-
tices Act, SHEARMAN & STERLING LLP 14 (Jan. 2012), http://www.shearman.com/~/media/
Files/NewsInsights/Publications/2012/01/Shearman—Sterlings-Recent-Trends-and-Pat
terns-i__/Files/View-January-2012-iRecent-Trends-and-Patterns-in__/FileAttachment/
FCPADigestTrendsandPatternsJan2012.pdf.
134 See, e.g., Oliver J. Armas, The U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act—An Overview, 22 INT’L
L. PRACTICUM 31, 37 (2009) (discussing comments made by Mark Mendelsohn, then-dep-
uty chief of the DOJ Fraud Section); 2010 Year-End FCPA Update, GIBSON, DUNN &
CRUTCHER LLP 1 (Jan. 3, 2011), http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/Documents/
2010YearEndFCPAUpdate.pdf (quoting Lanny A. Breuer, then-Assistant Attorney General,
as stating that “FCPA enforcement is stronger than it’s ever been—and getting stronger”).
135 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, A RESEARCH GUIDE TO THE U.S.
FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 12 (2012).
136 Id.
137 United States v. Kay, 359 F.3d 738, 739 (5th Cir. 2004).
138 Id. at 755.
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cations.139  Most recently, the DOJ has been investigating News Corp for
potential FCPA violations in connection with the bribes its newspapers in
London allegedly paid to British police officers for inside information.140
More aggressive FCPA enforcement is reflected not only in the number
and scope of enforcement actions, but also in the amount of monetary penal-
ties levied.  Until recent years, the amount of fines assessed in FCPA cases
rarely exceeded one million dollars.141  In 2008, Siemens AG settled FCPA-
related charges with DOJ for approximately $800 million, setting a record for
FCPA fines.142  A number of FCPA investigations in 2009 and 2010 also
resulted in settlements of hundreds of millions of dollars each.143
As the number of enforcement actions and the amount of penalties go
up, so do the expenses incurred for complying with the FCPA.  In December
2006, after evidence about its overseas bribes began to emerge, Siemens AG
hired the law firm Debevoise & Plimpton LLP and the accounting firm
Deloitte & Touche to conduct an internal investigation, which lasted for two
years at a final cost of nearly $1 billion.144  A five-year internal FCPA investi-
gation at Daimler AG cost at least $500 million, compared to the $185 mil-
lion Daimler eventually paid in penalties.145  It is estimated that a
multinational company spends, on average, $2 million on an internal FCPA
investigation in one country, with most FCPA investigations spanning several
countries.146
The boom in FCPA enforcement has benefited former FCPA regulators
who walked through the revolving door.  Because of the elevated importance
of FCPA compliance and defense, the expertise of those former regulators
has become much more valuable to law firms and industries.  For example,
Mark Mendelsohn, Deputy Chief of the DOJ Criminal Division’s Fraud Sec-
139 See Koehler, supra note 127, at 971–75 (discussing recent FCPA enforcement actions
concerning foreign licenses, permits, applications, certifications, and customs and tax
duties).
140 Michael Wolff, Murdoch’s News Corp Mulls FCPA Deal with US Justice Department, THE
GUARDIAN (Jun. 10, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/jun/10/
murdoch-news-corp-fcpa-deal-doj.
141 Westbrook, supra note 130, at 495.
142 Joseph W. Yockey, Solicitation, Extortion, and the FCPA, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 781,
791 & n.42 (2011).  When including its settlement with German authorities, Siemens AG
paid a total of $1.6 billion in fines. Id.
143 These settlements are: Halliburton and its former subsidiary Kellogg, Brown & Root
for $579 million, Snamprogetti Netherlands B.V. for $365 million, Panalpina World Trans-
port (Holding) Ltd. for $156 million, Technip S.A. for $338 million, BAE Systems PLC for
$400 million, and Daimler AG for $185 million. See id. at 791.
144 Nathan Vardi, The Bribery Racket, FORBES (June 7, 2010, 12:00 AM), http://www
.forbes.com/global/2010/0607/companies-payoffs-washington-extortion-mendelsohn-
bribery-racket.html.
145 Id.
146 Joe Palazzolo, FCPA Inc.: The Business of Bribery—Corruption Probes Become Profit Center
for Big Law Firms, WALL ST. J., Oct. 2, 2012, http://online.wsj.com/articles/SB1000087
2396390443862604578028462294611352.
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tion (the DOJ’s FCPA unit) between 2005 and 2010147 and the “architect” of
DOJ’s modern FCPA enforcement program,148 joined the law firm Paul,
Weiss upon leaving the DOJ reportedly for an annual salary of $2.5 mil-
lion.149  As another example, Lanny A. Breuer, the Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral of the DOJ’s Criminal Division who oversaw eight of the ten largest FCPA
penalties in U.S. history,150 returned to his law practice at the law firm Cov-
ington & Burling LLP in 2013 for an estimated salary of $4 million in the first
year.151
The fact that former FCPA regulators have benefitted from the boom in
FCPA enforcement does not necessarily mean that they increased FCPA
enforcement for personal gains.  Although some commentators have sug-
gested that such causal links might exist,152 no such conclusions could be
drawn without concrete evidence.  Indeed, there are many alternative rea-
sons why FCPA enforcement was suddenly revived in the early 2000s.  These
reasons include the adoption of international antibribery conventions and
key antibribery legislation in other jurisdictions in the late 1990s and early
2000s,153 the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,154 the outbreak
147 Mark F. Mendelsohn, PAUL, WEISS, RIFKIND, WHARTON & GARRISON LLP, http://www
.paulweiss.com/professionals/partners-and-counsel/mark-f-mendelsohn.aspx (last visited
Dec. 26, 2014) (“As deputy chief of the Fraud Section from 2005 to 2010, Mark was respon-
sible for overseeing all DOJ investigations and prosecutions under the FCPA . . . .”).
148 Id. (“Prior to joining Paul, Weiss, Mark served as the deputy chief of the Fraud
Section of the Criminal Division of the United States Department of Justice (DOJ), and is
internationally acknowledged and respected as the architect and key enforcement official
of DOJ’s modern Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) enforcement program.”).
149 Vardi, supra note 144.
150 See Press Release, Assistant Attorney General Lanny A. Breuer Announces Depar-
ture from Department of Justice, OFFICE OF PUB. AFFAIRS, DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Jan. 30, 2013),
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2013/January/13-ag-128.html.
151 Ben Protess, Once More Through the Revolving Door for Justice’s Breuer, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
28, 2013, http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/03/28/once-more-through-the-revolving-
door-for-justices-breuer/.
152 See, e.g., Vardi, supra note 144 (“[A]s the feds cranked up enforcement of the 33-
year-old Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), a thriving and lucrative antibribery com-
plex has emerged.”); Yockey, supra note 142, at 793 (“The rise in FCPA enforcement has
produced a cottage industry of FCPA experts, including lawyers, accountants, and consul-
tants at prestigious firms, which DOJ and SEC personnel often join after leaving their fed-
eral jobs for considerably higher compensation.” (footnote omitted)).
153 See Westbrook, supra note 130, at 510–15 (discussing international anticorruption
developments since the late 1990s).
154 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 imposed significant reporting and certification
requirements on issuers of securities and likely contributed to increased information for
FCPA investigations. See id. at 515–16; see also Yockey, supra note 142, at 793–94 (providing
examples of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act’s certification and reporting requirements and noting
that “[t]hese developments prompted an increasing number of firms to voluntarily disclose
potential FCPA violations”).
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of the United Nations Oil-for-Food Program scandals in 2005,155 and the
enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act in 2010.156
Yet the point here is that FCPA regulators at least have incentives to
increase FCPA enforcement if their goal is to maximize their exit opportuni-
ties.  Since the FCPA does not authorize private actions, the only demand for
FCPA regulators’ post-government services would come from the enforce-
ment actions brought by the regulators.  FCPA regulators would also have
incentives to increase enforcement, because there are not many alternative
uses—or at least not many equally profitable uses—of their specialized
knowledge and skills in bribery investigations.157  It is completely rational,
therefore, for a regulator contemplating a post-government career in the pri-
vate sector to maximize enforcement to the extent permitted by his or her
discretion.
C. Market Expansion in Rulemaking
1. Manifestations of the Market-Expansion Incentive
The market-expansion incentive may exist not only in the enforcement
setting, but also in the rulemaking setting.  Given that regulators enjoy wide
discretion in rulemaking, they may have incentives to make rules in a manner
that expands the market demand for their post-government services in inter-
preting the rules they made.  As discussed in detail below, the market-expan-
sion incentive may prompt rulemakers to engage in efforts to expand the
jurisdiction of their agencies, to make flexible standards rather than bright-
line rules, and to make complex as opposed to simple rules or standards.
First, to the extent that regulators are motivated by revolving-door con-
siderations, they may have incentives to expand the jurisdictions of their
agencies by expanding the scope of the subject matter covered by the rules
they make.  The logic of this incentive is straightforward: the more matters
that come under the purview of an agency rule, the more market demand
the regulators who are responsible for making the rule will create for their
expertise in interpreting the rule.
155 In 2005, a United Nations-commissioned investigative body released a report nam-
ing 2253 companies as having made corrupt payments of more than $1.8 billion to the
Iraqi government.  Those companies became ready-made candidates for FCPA enforce-
ment actions. See Westbrook, supra note 130, at 516–17.
156 Under the whistleblower provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act, any qualified persons
who provide original information about violations of securities laws, including the FCPA,
will receive an award of between 10–30% of the monetary penalties imposed on a firm in
excess of $1 million. See Yockey, supra note 142, at 794.
157 Note, however, that the value of regulators’ knowledge and expertise in a specific
area is not completely exogenous.  The more enforcement actions regulators bring in an
enforcement area and the higher monetary penalties the enforcement actions carry, the
more valuable regulators’ knowledge and expertise will become in that area.
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Second, revolving-door regulators may also have incentives to make flexi-
ble standards as opposed to bright-line rules.158  Bright-line rules, like the
one advocated by Oliver Wendell Holmes requiring a driver to “stop and
look” at an unguarded railroad crossing,159 prescribe specific rules of con-
duct on an ex ante basis and leave only factual issues for the future adjudica-
tor.160  By contrast, flexible standards, like the one advocated by Benjamin
Cardozo requiring a driver to act with reasonable caution at an unguarded
railroad crossing,161 are given content on an ex post basis and leave both the
determination of what constitutes permissible conduct and factual issues for
the future adjudicator.162  While much has been written about the relative
merits of rules versus standards,163 few inquiries have been made as to why
rulemakers might prefer rules over standards or vice versa.  The revolving
door supplies a potential answer to this question.  In the rulemaking setting,
the revolving door may motivate a rulemaker to choose standards over rules,
as standards may result in more market demand for the rulemaker’s rulemak-
ing expertise than rules.  The reasons for this preference are twofold.  First,
the process of adjudication is more costly if a standard governs, as the adjudi-
cation will require giving content to the standard.164  Second, the lack of
precision or specificity under a standard encourages costly efforts to avoid
158 Rules and standards can be described as different forms of legal directives that vary
in the relative discretion they afford the decisionmaker. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Foreword:
The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22, 57 (1992).  For more on the distinc-
tion between rules and standards, see generally Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An
Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557 (1992) (using an economic analysis to determine
whether legal commands should be implemented through rules or standards); Duncan
Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685, 1687–713
(1976) (examining the opposing models of individualism, which favors rules, and altruism,
which favors standards, on private law); Margaret Jane Radin, Reconsidering the Rule of Law,
69 B.U. L. REV. 781, 783–92 (1989) (arguing for a more modern interpretation of the rule
of law); Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577, 592–93
(1988); Pierre Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV. 379 (1985) (examining the
use of rules called crystals and standards known as mud in the property context).
159 Balt. & Ohio R.R. v. Goodman, 275 U.S. 66, 70 (1927).
160 Kaplow, supra note 158, at 559–60.
161 Pokora v. Wabash Ry. Co., 292 U.S. 98, 103–06 (1934).
162 Kaplow, supra note 158, at 560.
163 See, e.g., Colin S. Diver, The Optimal Precision of Administrative Rules, 93 YALE L.J. 65
(1983) (discussing the optimal precision of administrative rules); Isaac Ehrlich & Richard
A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 257 (1974) (proposing
an economic model of the optimal balance between specificity and generality in the formu-
lation of legal rules and standards); Kaplow, supra note 158 (analyzing how rules and stan-
dards should be designed and when rules or standards are likely to be preferable); Antonin
Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175 (1989) (advocating clear,
general principles of decision over personal discretion); Schlag, supra note 158 (discussing
the rules versus standards dialectic in various areas of law and particularly in constitutional
law).
164 Kaplow, supra note 158, at 570.
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compliance.165  Both the high enforcement costs and the high evasion and
concealment costs associated with standards will create more market demand
for the rulemaker’s post-government services.  Therefore, if a rulemaker
wanted to maximize his or her exit opportunities, standards instead of rules
would best serve his or her purposes.
Finally, the revolving door may also create incentives for regulators to
make complex rules or standards as opposed to simple ones.  The complexity
of rules or standards is conceptually distinct from the choice between rules
and standards: while the distinction between rules and standards is based on
when the rules or standards are given content, the complexity of rules or
standards describes the level of details of the rules or standards.166  Although
scholars have debated whether standards are inherently more complex than
rules,167 no discussions have been had about rulemakers’ incentives to
choose complex rules or standards over simple ones or vice versa.  Again, the
revolving door may be a potential factor.  In the rulemaking setting, regula-
tors who set their sights on the revolving door may have incentives to promul-
gate complex rules or standards over simple ones, as complex rules or
standards encompass broader considerations168 and therefore may generate
more market demand for regulators’ rulemaking expertise when they exit
the government.
The market-expansion incentive in the rulemaking process poses funda-
mentally different public policy concerns than those suggested by conven-
tional capture theories.  Capture theories predict that revolving-door
regulators will make rules friendly to industry interests at the expense of pub-
lic interests.169  According to the market-expansion theory, however, friendli-
ness or unfriendliness to the industry is not the primary concern of
regulators; regulators are more interested in promulgating rules that are
complex enough to require their expertise in interpretation.  When regula-
tors make industry-friendly yet simple rules, industry employers may have few
reasons to hire the regulators because the straightforwardness of the rules
would not justify the additional costs.
165 See Diver, supra note 163, at 73 (“Increased precision may increase compliance and
decrease evasion or concealment costs.”).
166 Kaplow, supra note 158, at 588–90.
167 Some scholars assert that rules tend to be both over- and under-inclusive relative to
standards. See, e.g., Diver, supra note 163, at 73; Ehrlich & Posner, supra note 163, at
268–70; Kennedy, supra note 158, at 1689–90; Frederick Schauer, Rules and the Rule of Law,
14 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 645, 646, 648–49 (1991).  Kaplow argues that these commenta-
tors must be implicitly comparing a complex standard to a simple rule.  Kaplow, supra note
158, at 589.  According to Kaplow, “there is no universal tendency for standards as they are
actually applied to be more complex than rules that would plausibly be promulgated.” Id.
at 596.
168 See Kaplow, supra note 158, at 594–96.
169 See supra Part II.
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2. Conditions Conducive to the Market-Expansion Incentive
As in the enforcement setting, one condition conducive to the market-
expansion incentive in the rulemaking setting is that regulators have suffi-
cient discretion in making rules.  This condition is likely to be met in most, if
not all, rulemaking settings.  To be sure, there are many procedural con-
straints on the rulemaking process.  Certain enabling statutes, of which the
best known is the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938, require “trial-type”
hearings in agency rulemaking.170  When the enabling statutes do not man-
date formal rulemaking, the Federal Administrative Procedure Act (APA)
requires agencies to at least provide an antecedent notice of rulemaking and
an opportunity for interested parties to comment or otherwise participate.171
These constraints, however, do not limit regulators’ discretion in terms of the
substance of the rules.  Indeed, a central notion underlying the modern
administrative state is that the comprehensive regulation required today is
too intricate and detailed for direct legislative processes.172  Although the
delegation of legislative power is required to be accompanied by “discernible
standards,”173 those standards only need to be “intelligent” enough to guide
agencies’ exercise of that power,174 leaving ample room for regulatory
discretion.
Regulators also enjoy wide discretion in rulemaking because of the def-
erence courts give to their interpretations of statutes.  In Chevron U.S.A. Inc.
v. Natural Resources Defense Council,175 the Supreme Court held that an
agency’s interpretations of federal statutes should be accorded deference as
long as they are reasonable and not contrary to the statutory text.176 Chevron
sets out a two-step inquiry for courts to follow when evaluating agency inter-
pretations of federal statutes.  In the first step of the inquiry, the court must
determine “whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at
issue.177  If so, the court “must give effect to the unambiguously expressed
intent of Congress.”178  If the statute is silent or ambiguous, however, the
court must proceed to the second step of the inquiry and must determine
whether the agency interpretation at issue is “based on a permissible con-
170 BERNARD SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 192 (3d ed. 1991).
171 Id. at 199–200.
172 Id. at 44.
173 See Eastlake v. Forest City Enters., Inc., 426 U.S. 668, 675 (1976) (“[A] congressional
delegation of power . . . must be accompanied by discernible standards, so that the dele-
gatee’s action can be measured for its fidelity to the legislative will.”).
174 Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989) (“Applying this ‘intelligible prin-
ciple’ test to congressional delegations, our jurisprudence has been driven by a practical
understanding that in our increasingly complex society, replete with ever changing and
more technical problems, Congress simply cannot do its job absent an ability to delegate
power under broad general directives.” (citation omitted)).
175 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
176 Timothy K. Armstrong, Chevron Deference and Agency Self-Interest, 13 CORNELL J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 203, 204 (2004).
177 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842.
178 Id. at 842–43.
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struction of the statute.”179  If so, the court is required to defer to the agency
interpretation even if the court would have interpreted the statute differently
on its own.180
Courts even afford judicial deference to an agency’s interpretations of
statutes concerning the scope of its own jurisdiction.  In City of Arlington v.
Federal Communications Commission, the Supreme Court held that when a court
reviews an agency’s interpretations of a statute it administers, the question is
always “whether the agency has stayed within the bounds of its statutory
authority.”181  According to the Court, the distinction between jurisdictional
and nonjurisdictional issues is an “empty distraction because every new appli-
cation of a broad statutory term can be reframed as a questionable extension
of the agency’s jurisdiction.”182  There is no principled basis, therefore, for
“carving out an arbitrary subset of ‘jurisdictional’ questions from the Chevron
framework.”183  The Court concluded that agencies should receive Chevron
deference as to their constructions of what might be considered jurisdic-
tional issues.184
In addition, courts also extend deference to agencies’ interpretations of
their own regulations.  In Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., the Supreme
Court held that the ultimate criterion for judicial construction of an ambigu-
ous regulation is “the administrative interpretation, which becomes of con-
trolling weight unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the
regulation.”185  Under this standard, courts must accept a plausible construc-
tion of a regulation even if it is not “the best or most natural one by grammat-
ical or other standards.”186
As in the enforcement setting, one other condition conducive to the
market-expansion incentive in the rulemaking setting is the presence of
rulemaking targets with financial resources to pay for regulators’ rulemaking
expertise.  All else being equal, the market-expansion incentive will be
stronger when the rulemaking targets can afford to hire former rulemakers
in their compliance efforts.187
179 Id. at 843.
180 Id. at 844 (“[A] court may not substitute its own construction of a statutory provi-
sion for a reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of an agency.” (footnote
omitted)).
181 City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1868 (2013) (emphasis omitted).
182 Id. at 1870.
183 Id. at 1865 (citation omitted).
184 Id. at 1874–75 (“[A] court need not pause to puzzle over whether the interpretive
question presented is ‘jurisdictional.’  If ‘the agency’s answer is based on a permissible
construction of the statute,’ that is the end of the matter.” (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at
843)).
185 Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945).
186 Pauley v. Bethenergy Mines, Inc., 501 U.S. 680, 702 (1991) (citation omitted).
187 For discussions of the “deep-pocket” effect in the enforcement setting, see supra
subsection III.B.2.
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IV. IMPLICATIONS
The market-expansion theory of the revolving door represents a paradig-
matic shift in conceptualizing the role of individual regulators in the regula-
tory process.  Like the capture and human-capital theories, the market-
expansion theory recognizes that what impacts regulators’ performance is
not only agencies’ institutional interests, but also individual regulators’ per-
sonal interests.  But in contrast to the capture and human-capital theories,
the market-expansion theory offers a different perspective on the power
dynamics between regulators and regulated industries.  Under the market-
expansion theory, revolving-door regulators do not passively respond to the
needs of regulated industries as the capture and human-capital theories pre-
dict; they proactively create and maintain the needs through market-expan-
sion efforts.188
Recognizing regulators’ market-expansion incentive has important
implications for a wide range of policy issues—issues that either have not
been examined from the revolving-door point of view, or have been
examined from the revolving-door point of view but have not benefited from
the insights offered by the market-expansion theory.  Without attempting to
offer an exhaustive list of such issues, this Article discusses below the implica-
tions of the market-expansion theory for agency aggrandizement, over-
enforcement versus underenforcement, regulatory settlements, compliance
monitors, private rights of action, and professional responsibility.
A. Agency Aggrandizement
Commentators have noted government agencies’ tendencies to aggran-
dize their powers.189  Agencies may seek self-aggrandizement by asserting a
new power not authorized by the legislature, by expanding the scope of an
existing power, or by claiming that their jurisdiction is triggered by the pres-
ence of a certain factual predicate.190  Under the conventional analysis, the
reasons for agency aggrandizement are institutional, ranging from agencies’
188 See supra Part III.
189 See, e.g., NISKANEN, supra note 99, at 36–42 (explaining that a bureaucrat’s primary
motivation is to maximize the budget of the bureau); Nathan Alexander Sales & Jonathan
H. Adler, The Rest Is Silence: Chevron Deference, Agency Jurisdiction, and Statutory Silences, 2009
U. ILL. L. REV. 1497, 1503–07 (discussing the aggrandizement of power by agencies). But
see Levinson, supra note 99, at 920 (questioning the basis of the belief that government
institutions seek empire-building).
190 Sales & Adler, supra note 189, at 1504–06.
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financial interests,191 to their desires to avoid becoming obsolete,192 and to
their need to attract new constituents.193
Yet the behavior of government institutions depends at least in part on
the personal interests of the government officials who comprise them.194
Although conventional analysis recognizes the role of regulators’ personal
interests in determining agency behavior,195 little attention has been paid to
the role of regulators’ revolving-door motivations in agency aggrandizement.
The market-expansion theory of the revolving door points to such a possibil-
ity.  Under the theory, regulators may have incentives to expand the jurisdic-
tional reach of their agencies not only to further the institutional interests of
the agencies, but also to further their personal interests in their post-govern-
ment careers.
The recognition of the potential role of regulators’ personal interests in
agency aggrandizement complicates the analysis of the proper level of judi-
cial deference that ought to be given to agencies’ interpretations of statutes
concerning the scope of their authority.  Scholars have argued that courts
should not accord Chevron deference to agencies’ jurisdictional interpreta-
tions when those interpretations lead to agency aggrandizement and self-
dealing.196  Yet in Arlington, the Supreme Court brushed aside these con-
cerns, holding that Chevron deference applies even when “concerns about
agency self-aggrandizement are at their apogee.”197  The Supreme Court’s
primary worry appears to be that the elimination of Chevron deference to
jurisdictional interpretations would eventually jeopardize Chevron deference
itself, given what the Supreme Court considers the “false dichotomy” between
“jurisdictional” and “non-jurisdictional” interpretations.198  Eliminating Chev-
191 Eric M. Braun, Note, Coring the Seedless Grape: A Reinterpretation of Chevron U.S.A.
Inc. v. NRDC, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 986, 1006–07 (1987) (arguing that agency aggrandize-
ment is at issue where an agency has a substantial and obvious financial interest).
192 Jonathan R. Macey, Administrative Agency Obsolescence and Interest Group Formation: A
Case Study of the SEC at Sixty, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 909, 926 (1994) (arguing that once an
agency is formed, it will deny that it has become obsolete by seeking to expand its regula-
tory turf into other areas).
193 See Gubler, supra note 11, at 771 (arguing that under the public-choice account of
the regulatory process, the SEC will try to expand its regulatory turf to attract new constitu-
ents and new beneficiaries of securities regulation).
194 Levinson, supra note 99, at 920.
195 See Lemos & Minzner, supra note 102, at 886–95 (examining whether regulators’
personal interests conflict with agencies’ financial interests).
196 See, e.g., Armstrong, supra note 176, at 244 (arguing that Chevron deference should
not be given to agencies’ jurisdictional interpretations “when [they] aggrandize power in
the agenc[ies] or otherwise advance . . . agenc[ies’] self-interest[s]); Cass R. Sunstein, Law
and Administration after Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2071, 2099 (1990) (arguing that Chev-
ron deference to agencies’ jurisdictional interpretations would allow agencies to be judges
in their own cause).
197 City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1872 (2013).
198 Id.
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ron deference, according to the Supreme Court, would raise separation of
power concerns.199
If the Supreme Court’s analysis in Arlington is entirely predicated on the
false distinction between “jurisdictional” and “non-jurisdictional” agency
interpretations, that raises a question as to whether the elimination or modi-
fication of Chevron deference would be warranted in scenarios that raise sig-
nificant public policy concerns counseling against Chevron deference and yet
are more easily distinguishable from the typical Chevron scenarios than the
“jurisdictional” versus “non-jurisdictional” distinction.  Agency aggrandize-
ment because of regulators’ market-expansion incentive might be such a sce-
nario.  The line between “jurisdictional” and “non-jurisdictional” agency
interpretations might be “specious” and “scary-sounding” as the Supreme
Court asserts,200 but courts have had little conceptual and practical difficul-
ties in identifying scenarios where agencies have their own financial interests
at stake and in holding that Chevron deference does not apply.201  Similarly,
there should be few conceptual and practical difficulties in identifying scena-
rios where individual regulators have their own financial interests at stake, at
least in scenarios where there has been a historical pattern of regulators exit-
ing the revolving door and benefiting from their preferred interpretations of
statutes.202  Public policy concerns about the revolving door may weigh in
favor of eliminating or modifying Chevron deference in such scenarios.203  In
199 Id. at 1873 (“The effect would be to transfer any number of interpretive decisions—
archetypal Chevron questions, about how best to construe an ambiguous term in light of
competing policy interests—from the agencies that administer the statutes to federal
courts.” (footnote omitted)).
200 Id.
201 See, e.g., S. Cal. Edison Co. v. United States, 226 F.3d 1349, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2000)
(“When a party enters into a contract with the government, that party should reasonably
expect to be on equal legal footing with the government should a dispute over the contract
arise.”); Brown v. United States, 195 F.3d 1334, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“The interpretation
of regulations which are incorporated into government contracts is a question of law which
this court is free to resolve.” (quoting United States v. Boeing Co., 802 F.2d 1390, 1393
(Fed. Cir. 1986)); Indep. Petroleum Ass’n of Am. v. Armstrong, 91 F. Supp. 2d 117, 124
(D.D.C. 2000) (“[N]o deference is due an agency’s interpretation of contracts in which it
has a proprietary interest.”).
202 The FCPA scenario would be an example of such scenarios.  For discussions of the
revolving door and the FCPA, see supra subsection III.B.3.
203 Scholars have proposed to modify Chevron deference in other contexts. See, e.g.,
David J. Barron & Elena Kagan, Chevron’s Nondelegation Doctrine, 2001 SUP. CT. REV. 201,
234–36 (proposing a Chevron nondelegation doctrine under which Chevron deference
applies only when the particular agency official Congress named in the relevant delegation
personally assumed responsibility for the agency action); Mark Seidenfeld, A Syncopated
Chevron: Emphasizing Reasoned Decisionmaking in Reviewing Agency Interpretations of Statutes,
73 TEX. L. REV. 83, 87 (1994) (proposing a modified Chevron deference that would require
reviewing courts to scrutinize more carefully the reasonableness of agencies’ statutory
interpretations).
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scenarios where there are no revolving-door concerns, however, Chevron def-
erence would still be preserved under this approach.204
B. Overenforcement Versus Underenforcement
Contrary to the conventional revolving-door theories, the market-expan-
sion theory and, to a lesser extent, the human-capital theory point to the
possibility that regulators may engage in more aggressive enforcement to
benefit their post-government careers.  The competing incentives facing
revolving-door regulators complicate the analysis of both the costs and the
benefits of the revolving door in the enforcement setting.
In areas where enforcement is already at or exceeds a socially optimal
level, regulators’ tendency to overenforce represents a cost to society that has
not been recognized under the conventional revolving-door theories.  Under
the influence of the capture theories, the costs of the revolving door have
primarily been expressed in terms of its tendency to cause lax regulation.205
As a result, the revolving door’s social costs associated with more aggressive
enforcement tend to be overlooked.  For example, deHaan, Koh, Kedia, and
Rajgopal, upon finding that the revolving door led SEC lawyers to increase
their enforcement efforts, argue that their results alleviate public concerns
that the revolving door is detrimental to the SEC’s regulatory efforts.206
David Zaring, upon finding that the revolving door does not appear to have
motivated a group of elite federal prosecutors to be lenient towards defend-
ants, and may have indeed motivated them to be more aggressive in their
prosecution work, urged policymakers to “[l]earn[ ] to [l]ive with the
[r]evolving [d]oor.”207  These views are implicitly based on the assumption
that the revolving door is socially undesirable only if it results in less aggres-
sive enforcement.
Yet more aggressive enforcement may be detrimental to social welfare,
too.  Scholars have analyzed the optimal level of law enforcement in various
settings.208  In particular, Gary Becker posited that the objective of public law
204 For example, the specific agency interpretation at issue in Arlington—the FCC’s
interpretation of the “reasonable amount of time” within which state or local governments
are required to act after receiving a siting application for wireless facilities—does not
appear to implicate FCC regulators’ personal interests in terms of their post-government
careers.  Under the approach suggested here, Chevron deference would still apply.
205 See supra Section I.A.
206 See deHaan et al., supra note 15, at 26.
207 Zaring, supra note 9, at 546.
208 See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk & Louis Kaplow, Optimal Sanctions When Individuals Are
Imperfectly Informed About the Probability of Apprehension, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 365 (1992); Gary S.
Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169 (1968); Omri
Ben-Shahar & Alon Harel, The Economics of the Law of Criminal Attempts: A Victim-Centered
Perspective, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 299 (1996); Louis Kaplow, A Note on the Optimal Use of Non-
monetary Sanctions, 42 J. PUB. ECON. 245 (1990); A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell,
Enforcement Costs and the Optimal Magnitude and Probability of Fines, 35 J.L. & ECON. 133
(1992); A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Optimal Use of Fines and Fines and Impris-
onment, 24 J. PUB. ECON. 89 (1984); Steven Shavell, The Optimal Use of Nonmonetary Sanctions
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enforcement is to maximize social welfare, defined as the sum of individuals’
benefits minus the harms caused by their acts and enforcement costs.209
One fundamental insight of Becker’s analytical framework is that there exists
an optimal level of law enforcement, even though it might not be clear what
that optimal level is.210  According to this line of analysis, more aggressive
enforcement does not necessarily enhance social welfare; it may indeed lead
to overenforcement and therefore reduce social welfare if the enforcement’s
costs outweigh its benefits.211
As a result, a better appreciation of the complex incentives created by
the revolving door calls for a more nuanced analysis of the social costs of the
revolving door.  When enforcement is already at or exceeds the socially opti-
mal level—that is, when the social benefits of enforcement are already equal
to or are outweighed by its costs—additional enforcement efforts stemming
from regulators’ market-expansion or human-capital incentives may lead to
overenforcement and may be detrimental to social welfare.212  Therefore,
the revolving door poses public policy concerns not only when it leads to
underenforcement because of capture, but also when it leads to overenforce-
ment because of the market-expansion and human-capital incentives.
The flip side of the above analysis is that regulators’ market-expansion
and human-capital incentives may produce under-recognized social benefits,
too.  Commentators have recognized many benefits of the revolving door: it
enables the government to hire employees that it otherwise would not be
as a Deterrent, 77 AM. ECON. REV. 584 (1987); Louis L. Wilde, Criminal Choice, Nonmonetary
Sanctions, and Marginal Deterrence: A Normative Analysis, 12 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 333
(1992).
209 See Becker, supra note 208, at 172–80; Nuno Garoupa, The Theory of Optimal Law
Enforcement, 11 J. ECON. SURV. 267, 268–69 (1997).
210 Under Becker’s framework, the optimal level of fine that maximizes the social wel-
fare is the maximal level of fine possible, as the fine is a costless transfer whereas enforce-
ment is costly.  Garoupa, supra note 209, at 268.  The optimal level of law enforcement is
determined accordingly. Id.  Subsequent studies have attempted to investigate the circum-
stances under which the maximal fine may be nonoptimal. Id.  But regardless of what the
optimal level of fine is, there is always an optimal level of law enforcement that corre-
sponds to that optimal level of fine.
211 A different formulation of the overenforcement thesis is that “[o]verenforcement
occurs when the total sanction . . . suffered by the violator of a legal rule exceeds the
amount optimal for deterrence.”  Richard A. Bierschbach & Alex Stein, Overenforcement, 93
GEO. L.J. 1743, 1743 (2005).
212 Commentators have recognized the possibility of overenforcement in other con-
texts. See, e.g., id. at 1771–77 (discussing the problem of overenforcement in corporate law
context); Paul G. Mahoney, Precaution Costs and the Law of Fraud in Impersonal Markets, 78
VA. L. REV. 623, 653–55 (1992) (arguing that overenforcement of securities laws may lead
to companies communicating more often through signals such as stock splits); Paul Weit-
zel, The End of Shareholder Litigation? Allowing Shareholders to Customize Enforcement Through
Arbitration Provisions in Charters and Bylaws, 2013 BYU L. REV. 65, 72–79 (arguing that over-
enforcement in shareholder litigation can create more costs than benefits).
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able to hire,213 allows citizens to participate in the government,214 and fos-
ters close regulator-industry collaboration that may improve the regulatory
process.215  But one benefit of the revolving door that so far has escaped
commentators’ attention is its usefulness in compensating for the lack of
enforcement in regulatory areas characterized by underenforcement.  Gov-
ernment regulators have a tendency to underenforce certain statutory
requirements for a number of reasons, including political pressure, lobbying
by regulated entities, or the laziness or self-interest of the regulators them-
selves.216  Such underenforcement is less than socially optimal if additional
enforcement efforts would yield more benefits than their costs.  In such
cases, regulators’ market-expansion and human-capital incentives may play a
welcome remedying role in moving the enforcement level closer to the social
optimum.217
C. Regulatory Settlements
Revolving-door regulators’ market-expansion incentive may also affect
their tactics with respect to regulatory settlements.  It has been observed that
at least in some cases, government agencies have a tendency to prolong litiga-
tion.218  An explanation offered to make sense of such tendency is that gov-
ernment lawyers see themselves as the guardians of the public treasury and
are not willing to concede on even the smallest issues.219
213 Scholars have studied the effects of revolving-door restrictions on the expertise of
government employees.  Marc Law and Cheryl Long examined how revolving-door regula-
tions affected the characteristics of state public utility commissioners in the United States.
Marc T. Law & Cheryl X. Long, Revolving Door Laws and State Public Utility Commissioners, 5
REG. & GOVERNANCE 405, 420 (2011).  They found that commissioners from states with
revolving-door regulations have less expertise, serve shorter terms, and are less likely to be
subsequently employed by the private sector, compared with their counterparts from states
without revolving-door laws. Id. at 405.  In a setting analogous to the revolving door scena-
rio, Marshall Geiger et al. studied how the market reacts to firms’ hiring of accounting and
finance officers from their external audit firms and found that the market values the
revolving-door appointments more positively than other appointments. See Marshall A.
Geiger et al., The Hiring of Accounting and Finance Officers from Audit Firms: How Did the
Market React?, 13 REV. ACCT. STUD. 55, 55 (2008).
214 Zaring, supra note 9, at 546.
215 Dorit Rubinstein Reiss, The Benefits of Capture, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 569, 595–605
(2012) (examining the potential benefits of a close regulator-industry relationship).
216 Matthew C. Stephenson, Public Regulation of Private Enforcement: The Case for
Expanding the Role of Administrative Agencies, 91 VA. L. REV. 93, 110 (2005).
217 Note, however, that the market-expansion and human-capital incentives may not be
strong enough to affect enforcement outcomes in every enforcement setting.  When the
enforcement targets do not have a “deep pocket,” for example, the market-expansion
incentive may not be relied upon to play a compensatory role.
218 An example is the twenty-eight-year-long patent infringement litigation between
NASA and Hughes Aircraft. See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Reflections on
Professional Responsibility in a Regulatory State, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1105, 1117 (1995).
219 For example, in explaining why the patent infringement disputes between Hughes
Aircraft and NASA took so long to resolve, a lawyer representing Hughes Aircraft in the
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Yet such cases are rare compared to the more common pattern of gov-
ernment agencies avoiding prolonged litigation—or litigation altogether—
through regulatory settlements.  In antitrust, for example, the Antitrust Divi-
sion of the DOJ has resolved nearly its entire civil enforcement docket from
2004 onward through consent decrees,220 resulting in what commentators
call a “culture of consent.”221  For another example, in recent years, the DOJ
has increasingly used deferred-prosecution agreements (DPAs) and nonp-
rosecution agreements (NPAs) to settle corporate crime investigations.222
Under a DPA, the prosecutor files a criminal charge against a company, but
agrees not to prosecute the claim so long as the defendant complies with the
terms of a deferral agreement.223  Under an NPA, the prosecutor agrees not
to file a charge in exchange for the defendant’s commitments to comply with
a nonprosecution agreement.224
What are agencies trying to accomplish in these regulatory settlements?
An earlier view, consistent with the “public interest” conceptualization of reg-
ulation in general, assumes that agencies further the public interest in regu-
latory settlements.225  Subsequent views take a more nuanced approach,
recognizing that agencies may seek regulatory settlements to serve their
bureaucratic interests, including broadening the agencies’ goals and respon-
sibilities, benefiting particular interest groups, and accumulating power over
the regulated industry.226
Absent from the public discourse on regulatory settlements, however, is
the question of how regulatory settlements might be affected by the financial
incentives of individual regulators, particular those who have revolving-door
aspirations.  A logical extension of the market-expansion theory set forth in
disputes stated that “[a]ttorneys for the government feel they have to protect the public
treasury, so they never concede anything.  Therefore, you have to litigate every issue.” See
id. at 1117 (quoting Bruce Rubenstein, $114 Million Not Enough: Hughes Aircraft Appeals
Latest Judgment in 28-Year-Long Saga, CORP. LEGAL TIMES, Oct. 1994, at 1).
220 Douglas H. Ginsburg & Joshua D. Wright, Antitrust Settlements: The Culture of Consent,
para. 1 (Geo. Mason Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 13-18), available at http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2225894.
221 Id. para. 4.
222 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-110, CORPORATE CRIME: DOJ HAS
TAKEN STEPS TO BETTER TRACK ITS USE OF DEFERRED AND NON-PROSECUTION AGREEMENTS,
BUT SHOULD EVALUATE EFFECTIVENESS 13 (2009), available at http://www.gao.gov/new
.items/d10110.pdf [hereinafter GAO REPORT ON DPAS AND NPAS] (noting the more fre-
quent use of DPAs and NPAs by the DOJ in recent years); see also David M. Uhlmann,
Deferred Prosecution and Non-Prosecution Agreements and the Erosion of Corporate Criminal Liabil-
ity, 72 MD. L. REV. 1295, 1307–08 (2013) (tracing the use of DPAs and NPAs by the DOJ).
223 Peter Spivack & Sujit Raman, Regulating the “New Regulators”: Current Trends in
Deferred Prosecution Agreements, 45 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 159, 160 (2008).
224 Id.; see also Koehler, supra note 127, at 934.
225 See Michael J. Zimmer & Charles A. Sullivan, Consent Decree Settlements by Administra-
tive Agencies in Antitrust and Employment Discrimination: Optimizing Public and Private Interests,
1976 DUKE L.J. 163, 170 (“Agency settlements of court proceedings are, like all administra-
tive actions, supposed to further the public interest.”).
226 Ginsburg & Wright, supra note 220, para. 13.
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this Article is that revolving-door regulators might favor the use of regulatory
settlements to extract higher penalties from the defendants than they other-
wise would be able to obtain in courts,227 so as to expand the market demand
for the legal defense and compliance services they would be providing when
they exit the government.  Revolving-door regulators might also favor the use
of regulatory settlements to avoid judicial scrutiny of their enforcement theo-
ries, given the lack of meaningful judicial oversight of regulatory
settlements.228
One indication that the revolving-door factor might play a role in regula-
tory settlements is the use of NPAs and DPAs in FCPA enforcement, an area
where there has been a pattern of regulators exiting the revolving door to
lucrative private sector positions.229  The vast majority of FCPA enforcement
actions brought in the last two decades were disposed of through NPAs,
DPAs, pleas, and settlements.230  And the legal theories used in those actions
were quite vulnerable.231  Although this pattern in and of itself is not evi-
dence that FCPA regulators sought regulatory settlements for purposes of
furthering their post-government careers, it at least shows that revolving-door
regulators would have incentives to resort to regulatory settlements if their
goal was to expand the market demand for their post-government services.
That revolving-door regulators may use regulatory settlements to benefit
their post-government careers has important policy implications.  When the
market-expansion incentive of revolving-door regulators is not socially desira-
ble, one possible way to rein in the incentive might be to curtail the use of
regulatory settlements, either through legislative action or through judicial
oversight.  The extent to which the practice of regulatory settlements should
be modified to take account of the revolving-door factor is an important pol-
icy question that needs to be further examined.
D. Compliance Monitors
Closely related to the use of regulatory settlements is the use of compli-
ance monitors, also known by other names such as independent consultants,
independent compliance consultants, and corporate compliance
227 However, in any specific cases, whether an agency can indeed obtain concessions
beyond the remedies it might obtain in courts depends on the defendant’s comparison of
the costs and benefits of litigation as opposed to the costs and benefits of a settlement. See
id. para. 9.
228 A GAO survey of twelve U.S. district and magistrate judges who handled cases involv-
ing DPAs found that those judges “were generally not involved in the DPA process.” GAO
REPORT ON DPAS AND NPAS, supra note 222, at 25 (footnote omitted).
229 See supra subsection III.B.3 for discussions of the door phenomenon in FCPA
enforcement.
230 See Koehler, supra note 127, at 932–46 (discussing the use of settlements by the DOJ
and the SEC in FCPA enforcement).
231 See id. at 946–59 (discussing the vulnerability of the government’s legal positions in
FCPA enforcement actions).
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monitors.232  Since the early 1990s, the DOJ and other federal agencies have
appointed monitors to ensure compliance with DPAs and NPAs in a wide
range of cases, including securities fraud, tax fraud, and FCPA.233  For exam-
ple, of the 152 DPAs and NPAs negotiated by the DOJ between 1993 and
2009, forty-eight required the appointment of a compliance monitor.234
Typically appointed for a term of one to three years,235 a compliance
monitor enjoys wide powers, including overseeing the operations of the firm,
making day-to-day decisions for the firm, and restructuring the firm’s inter-
nal processes.236  They are expensive, too; their individual hourly rates can
run as high as $1,000, and they come with a “phalanx of lawyers and expert
consultants all of whom charge market rates as well.”237
While much scholarly attention has been devoted to the proper roles of
compliance monitors,238 a less analyzed issue is who the monitors are and
why they are appointed.  Data indicates a clear pattern in the selection of
compliance monitors: a large percentage of them are former regulators or
prosecutors.  A U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) study found
that for all forty-eight DPAs or NPAs the DOJ entered into between 1993 and
2009 that required the appointment of monitors, companies hired a total of
forty-two different individuals, twenty-three of whom had previous experi-
ence working for the DOJ.239  Another study of twenty-five compliance
monitors found that at least seventeen were ex-federal prosecutors, and
others included a former SEC Chairman and ex-SEC General Counsel.240
On a list of forty monitors submitted by the DOJ to the House Judiciary Com-
232 Veronica Root, The Monitor-“Client” Relationship, 100 VA. L. REV. 523, 524 n.1 (2014).
233 See Vikramaditya Khanna & Timothy L. Dickinson, The Corporate Monitor: The New
Corporate Czar?, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1713, 1717–20 (2007).  Brandon Garrett refers to these
cases as “structural reform prosecution[s].” See Brandon L. Garrett, Structural Reform Prose-
cution, 93 VA. L. REV. 853, 853 (2007).
234 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-260T, CORPORATE CRIME: PROSECUTORS
ADHERED TO GUIDANCE IN SELECTING MONITORS FOR DEFERRED PROSECUTION AND NON-PROS-
ECUTION AGREEMENTS, BUT DOJ COULD BETTER COMMUNICATE ITS ROLE IN RESOLVING CON-
FLICTS 3 (2009), available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/130/123772.pdf [hereinafter GAO
REPORT ON MONITORS].
235 D. Daniel Sokol, Policing the Firm, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 785, 826 (2013).
236 Khanna & Dickinson, supra note 233, at 1724.
237 Kathleen M. Boozang & Simone Handler-Hutchinson, “Monitoring” Corporate Corrup-
tion: DOJ’s Use of Deferred Prosecution Agreements in Health Care, 35 AM. J.L. & MED. 89, 100–01
(2009).
238 See, e.g., Cristie Ford & David Hess, Can Corporate Monitorships Improve Corporate Com-
pliance?, 34 J. CORP. L. 679, 730–37 (2009) (proposing reform measures to improve corpo-
rate monitorships); Khanna & Dickinson, supra note 233, at 1727–42 (analyzing when it is
desirable to appoint monitors and what powers and obligations they should have); Root,
supra note 232 (arguing for the creation of a statutory privilege for the monitor-client
relationship); Sokol, supra note 235 (advocating for the imposition of corporate monitors
in criminal antitrust cases).
239 GAO REPORT ON MONITORS, supra note 234, at 5.
240 Ford & Hess, supra note 238, at 713.
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mittee in May 2008, thirty were former government employees, including
twenty-three former prosecutors.241
In light of regulators’ market-expansion incentive, the large percentage
of compliance monitors who are former regulators raises revolving-door con-
cerns.  In theory, the government agency and the company involved work
together to select the monitor.242  But in effect, it is the government agency
that chooses the monitor; in some cases, the agency provides an approved list
of candidates from which to choose, and in others, the agency retains veto
power over the appointment.243  Clearly, the appointment of former regula-
tors as compliance monitors expands the market demand for the expertise of
former regulators.  To the extent that revolving-door regulators aim to
expand the market demand for their post-government services, the use of
regulatory settlements coupled with the appointment of former regulators as
compliance monitors would be one certain way to achieve that goal.  The
revolving-door concern, therefore, is one additional factor counseling for
increased scrutiny of the appointment of compliance monitors.
E. Private Rights of Action
The market-expansion incentive of revolving-door regulators may also
change the standard analysis of private rights of action.  Many statutory
schemes authorize private citizens to file lawsuits to vindicate the public inter-
est,244 giving rise to the widely used concept of “private attorney general.”245
These private rights of action have long been thought to supplement public
enforcement in enforcing statutory rights or obligations.  The Supreme
Court, for example, held in 1964 that a private right of action should be
implied in favor of injured investors under federal securities laws because
private enforcement was necessary to “make effective the congressional pur-
pose.”246  In particular, private rights of action are thought to play an impor-
tant role in compensating for “agency slack,” that is, the tendency of
government regulators to underenforce certain statutory requirements.247
According to this view, private enforcement can be a substitute for agency
prosecutions in areas where the agency is excessively lax, or can prod an
agency into action.248
241 Id.
242 GAO REPORT ON DPAS AND NPAS, supra note 222, at 1.
243 Khanna & Dickinson, supra note 233, at 1722–23.
244 John C. Coffee, Jr., Rescuing the Private Attorney General: Why the Model of the Lawyer as
Bounty Hunter Is Not Working, 42 MD. L. REV. 215, 215–16 (1983).  Such private rights of
action are authorized in, among others, antitrust law, and securities law. Id.
245 For discussions of the evolution of the private attorney general concept, see William
B. Rubenstein, On What a “Private Attorney General” Is—And Why It Matters, 57 VAND. L. REV.
2129, 2133–37 (2004).
246 J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 433 (1964).
247 See, e.g., Stephenson, supra note 216, at 110.
248 Id.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\90-3\NDL307.txt unknown Seq: 43 23-FEB-15 12:01
2015] the  revolving  door 1307
Yet the market-expansion incentive of revolving-door regulators eluci-
dated in this Article points to an unintended consequence of the creation of
a private right of action.  In areas where the revolving door is a common
phenomenon and regulators are motivated by market-expansion considera-
tions, the creation of a private right of action might result in a reduction in
regulators’ incentives to bring public enforcement actions.  That is because
everything else being equal, regulators will have maximum incentives to
bring public enforcement actions when such actions are the only source of
market demand for their post-government services.  When market demand
for their post-government services comes from not only public but also pri-
vate enforcement actions, revolving-door regulators need not devote as much
market-expansion effort on their part to maintain the sale level of market
demand.249  This offsetting effect ought to be taken into account in policy
deliberations over the creation of a private right of action, at least in areas
where the revolving door is a common phenomenon.
F. Professional Responsibility
When revolving-door regulators are lawyers, their potential market-
expansion incentive also raises thorny professional-responsibility issues.
Under legal ethics rules, lawyers’ professional responsibilities consist of
duties of loyalty, zeal, and confidentiality to their clients, tempered by certain
duties to the broader public such as duties not to mislead the court and not
to unduly injure the interests of third parties.250  The professional responsi-
bilities of government agency lawyers are complicated by the question of who
their “client” is—their immediate agency employer or the broader public
whose interests they supposedly represent.251  But regardless of who the
agency lawyer’s client is, agency lawyers are not supposed to pursue personal
interests or any interests other than those of their client.
The ethics issues that may arise when agency lawyers pursue personal
interests in discharging their official duties have been recognized in the legal
ethics literature.252  But under the influence of capture theories, the kinds of
ethics issues that have been recognized are those stemming from agency cap-
249 This effect also points to a potential way to empirically test whether the market-
expansion incentive is the dominant incentive in a specific revolving-door setting.
Researchers could compare the number of public enforcement actions and the penalties
levied in such actions before and after the creation of a private right of action, controlling
for other factors that might affect public enforcement.  If there is a statistically significant
decrease in the level and intensity of public enforcement actions after the creation of a
private right of action, that might be an indication that the market-expansion incentive is
the dominant incentive facing regulators in that regulatory setting.
250 Note, Rethinking the Professional Responsibilities of Federal Agency Lawyers, 115 HARV. L.
REV. 1170, 1171 (2002).
251 See id. at 1173 (describing the “agency loyalty” approach and the “public interest”
approach to agency lawyering).
252 See, e.g., Macey & Miller, supra note 218, at 1117–18 (discussing ethics issues facing
agency lawyers).
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ture, that is, when agency lawyers “sell out” their agencies in order to curry
favor with private-sector lawyers that they later hope to practice with.253  The
market-expansion theory discussed in this Article suggests that revolving-door
lawyers face a similar ethics issue when they engage in market-expansion
efforts in discharging their official duties.  This is particularly so when such
market-expansion efforts are less than socially optimal and therefore conflict
with the public interest.254
CONCLUDING REMARKS
What performance incentives does the revolving door create for regula-
tors?  For so long, the answer to this question has been presumed to be regu-
latory capture, and it is not until recently that scholars have shifted their
attention to a possible human-capital effect of the revolving door.  This Arti-
cle breaks new ground by proposing a market-expansion theory of the revolv-
ing door that focuses on regulators’ incentive to expand the market demand
for their post-government services.  This Article argues that this market-
expansion incentive, which so far has received only isolated attention from
scholars and policymakers, deserves being recognized as a structural force
inherent in the regulatory process.
While this Article focuses on the market-expansion incentive, it is impor-
tant to emphasize that this Article does not intend to argue that the market-
expansion incentive is the only possible incentive motivating revolving-door
regulators.  More likely than not, the market-expansion incentive coexists
with other possible incentives in any specific regulatory settings, making the
question of how the revolving door impacts regulatory performance a ques-
tion that can be answered only through empirical studies.  After all, policy
responses to an issue as far-reaching as the revolving door ought not be based
on presumptions alone.  This Article can be, and the hope is that it will be,
used as a steppingstone for such empirical studies.
253 Id.
254 For a social welfare analysis of the revolving door, see supra Section IV.B.
